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Gerneral Introduction
This dissertation consists of three self-contained chapters. The underlying themes are the
analysis of rms’ strategic behavior under a dynamic framework, when facing changes in the
competitive environment due to certain rm’s behavior, economic shocks, or policy regulations
in the market.
The rst two chapters investigate how technology sharing promotes the development of a
newly emerging market – plug-in hybrid and electric vehicle industry in the US. In chapter one,
I explore the eects of open source initiative on car manufacturers’ entry decisions and quality
positionings. Chapter two explains why it is protable for rms to share their technologies
and how the whole industry benets from it. The third chapter is co-authored with Michelle
Sovinsky, where we analyze whether advertising can be used as a pre-emptive tool.
In what follows, I summarize each chapter.
Chapter 1
Does Open Source Pay o in the Plug-in Hybrid and Electric Vehicle
Industry? A Study of Tesla’s Open-Source Initiative
In this chapter, I quantify the eect of Tesla’s open source initiative on the development of the
plug-in hybrid and electric vehicle (PHEV) industry in the US. On the one hand, open source
allows the PHEV manufacturers to use the more advanced technology of Tesla, which leads
to a lower investment cost and a higher incentive to invest. Open source also provides more
information for the potential PHEV producers, which may partially remove the entry barriers.
This attracts more entrants and induces economies of scale to decrease manufacturing costs.
On the other hand, underinvestment of Tesla’s rivals may occur as a result of free riding, which
could lead to slower quality improvement in the industry.
To capture the various impacts of open source, I develop and estimate a dynamic structural
oligopoly model, where I incorporate entry and investment decisions of each PHEV and allow
marginal manufacturing costs to depend on the number of active PHEVs. Using the two-step
estimation technique, I recover the investment cost and distribution of entry costs before and
after open source which took place in June 2014. My results show that open source results
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in a 60% drop in investment costs, and a decrease of approximately 100 million in entry costs
into the PHEV industry.
Chapter 2
Valuation of Open Source – Evidence from the US Automobile
Industry
In this chapter, I use the framework and estimation proposed and employed in the previous
chapter to conduct a counterfactual analysis, where the open source movement does not take
place. The aim is to evaluate how the reduction in investment cost and entry cost induced by
open source aect the industry structure and the monetary returns of the PHEV manufacturers.
More precisely, I forward simulate the PHEVs strategic behavior of entry and investment
under the assumption that the entry cost distribution and unit investment cost are as high
as before open source occurred. In addition, I perform a reduced-form analysis using the
estimates from the previous chapter to distinguish the eect of these two costs on the market
expansion.
I nd that fewer PHEVs are present in the simulated scenario. While there are 37 distinct
models in the data, only 25 PHEVs exist in the counterfactual analysis. The overall discounted
returns of PHEVs are lower as well, mainly driven by the substantially high investment expen-
diture. Compared to the reduction of entry costs, the decrease in investment cost explains the
market expansion more.
Chapter 3
The Pre-emptive Eects of Advertising: Dynamics in the CPU
Industry
This chapter is joint work with Michelle Sovinsky. We investigate the role of advertising
in the CPU industry, taking into account the dynamic nature of advertising. That is, the
advertisement today will have an impact on consumers’ purchase decisions tomorrow. In
particular, we test whether Intel uses advertising as a preemptive tool to weaken its main rival
– AMD.
We nd, in general, both CPU manufacturers enjoy a positive return to their revenue from
advertisement expenditure, and advertising is not only eective in the current period but
also for the future. However, during the period when Intel is accused of illegally using the
marketing campaign, an Intel CPU with better quality and higher advertisement expenditure
2
does not necessarily lead to a higher prot. That suggests Intel indeed use advertising in an
anti-competitive fashion.
3

1 Does Open Source Pay o in the
Plug-in Hybrid and Electric Vehicle
Industry?
A Study of Tesla’s Open-Source
Initiative
1.1 Introduction
Does technology sharing contribute to the development of a newly emerging industry? To
what extent will that positive eect be? In June 2014, the CEO of Tesla, one of the major
manufacturers of electric vehicles, Elon Musk made a surprise announcement: "in the spirit
of the open-source movement, the wall of Tesla patents has been removed for the advancement
of electric vehicle technology".1 What eect has this open source initiative had on this newly
emerging industry and on Tesla? These are the questions at the forefront of this research
paper.
It may seem obvious that the open source initiative could only have a positive impact.
However, in reality, it may generate dierent impacts on the development of the plug-in
hybrid and electric vehicle (PHEV) industry, as well as on the open source rm – Tesla. On the
one hand, it allows rivals to get access to Tesla’s more advanced technology without cost, and
hence decreases the cost of investment. On the other hand, Tesla’s rivals lose the incentive
to develop new technology, which could result in underinvestment in this newly emerging
industry. Furthermore, as Tesla’s patents reveal the technology and the costs that potential
entrants need to enter the PHEV industry, the entry barriers are partly removed, leading
to industry expansion. Thus, the demand for the PHEV-specic accessories and mechanical
1Elon Musk, ’All Our patents Belong to You’, Tesla Motors, 12 June 2014, https://www.tesla.com/blog/all-our-
patent-are-belong-you
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components increases and induces economies of scale for the upstream rms. The reduction
of manufacturing costs could further lead to a decrease in prices.
The eect of open source on Tesla itself is also not obvious. Rivals’ investments on the
follow-up innovation of Tesla’s technology may have a spillover eect on Tesla.2 As Tesla
is more familiar with its own technology that they shared with competitors, it would also
have a higher probability of successfully adopting the follow-up innovation of its competitors
(Harho et al., 2003). However, Tesla may be worse o if it faces ercer competition due to
open source resulting in more PHEV competitors.
To capture the various impacts of open source mentioned above, I develop and estimate a
dynamic structural oligopoly model in the spirit of Ericson and Pakes (1995), where I incorpo-
rate entry and investment decisions of each PHEV and allow marginal manufacturing costs
to depend on the number of active PHEVs. PHEVs choose investments to improve quality,
which leads to higher prots in the product market, where they compete with conventional
counterpartners. PHEVs are assumed to make entry and investment decisions based on the
current industry state – the quality distribution of PHEVs, and their private shocks in entry
and investment costs, which leads to a Markov-perfect Nash equilibrium.
To estimate the model, I use data from several sources. The information on sales, prices
and characteristics of both PHEVs and conventional cars allow me to estimate the demand
parameters.3 With these parameters, I construct quality measures of all PHEVs based on their
characteristics from 2012 to 2017. I follow a two-step estimation procedure (à la Bajari et al.
(2007)) to recover the investment and entry costs that determine the dynamics of the PHEV
industry.4 In the rst step, I estimate the parameters that characterize the equilibrium behaviors
of PHEVs. In the second step, I nd the structural parameters, entry and investment costs, that
maintain the optimality of the estimated behaviors. Those estimates are recovered before and
after Tesla’s open source initiative.
My research contributes to the literature of open source by quantifying the dierent eects
of open source using a structural model. Previous research mainly focuses on understanding
the incentive of programmers to contribute to open source software (Lerner and Tirole, 2002;
Hann et al., 2004; Raymond, 2001) or incentive of rms to provide open source software (Baake
and Wichmann, 2003; Bonaccorsi and Rossi, 2003; Conti et al., 2013; Lerner and Tirole, 2005)5
2Rivals’ follow-up innovation based on Tesla’s technology has to be open as well.
3I follow the classical discrete-choice literature (Berry, 1994; Berry et al., 1995; Nevo, 2001).
4The two-step estimation is introduced by Hotz and Miller (1993) into the single-agent dynamic model and
extended by Aguirregabiria et al. (2007); Bajari et al. (2007) into dynamic games.
5Hann et al. (2004) nd that programmers use the contribution to open source software as a signal for
productivity. Lerner and Tirole (2005) suggests that one benet of using open source is that making code available
to everyone induces the sophisticated end-users to debug and to improve the quality of the software.
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mainly in a qualitative way. I extend the study on open source to a more complex industry
and one that includes hardware.
I also contribute to the literature on the adoption of alternative-energy vehicles, where most
study incentives on the consumer side (Beresteanu and Li, 2011; Chen et al., 2010; Gallagher
and Muehlegger, 2011; Kahn, 2007), or the network eect of charging stations (Li et al., 2017).
Beresteanu and Li (2011) and Gallagher and Muehlegger (2011) both nd a positive impact of
higher gasoline prices, income tax reduction of hybrid car drivers and other non-monetary
incentives on the adoption of alternative-fuel vehicles. Li et al. (2017) nd federal income tax
credit program for EV buyers will result in an increase in both EV sales and charging stations,
leading to feedback loops and amplifying the demand incentive. Rather than studying the
eectiveness of incentive on demand side, I focus on how car producers change their innovation
behavior when the supply side environment changes, and that in turn results in changes of
purchase decision of consumers.
My paper is also related to the growing literature of empirical analysis on industry dynamics.
Deviating from Collard-Wexler (2013), Kalouptsidi (2014) and Ryan (2012) where rms/players
are assumed to be homogeneous, I use a richer demand side specication where consumers
choose from heterogeneous products.
I nd that investment costs and entry costs both decrease dramatically after open source.
Unit investment cost drops from around $17 million to $6.5 million. The PHEV entrants had
to pay $555 to $595 million to enter the industry prior to the open source initiative, while
post-open-source the entry cost distribution shifts to $460 to $520 million. My results also
show that marginal costs of production decrease with the number of active PHEVs, conrming
the existence of economies of scale in the industry.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the PHEV industry briey
and the relevant data. In section 3, I describe the theoretical model. In section 4, I present the
estimation technique and the results are shown in section 5. I conclude in section 6.
1.2 Industry and Data
1.2.1 Electric and plug-in hybrid vehicle industry
The production of electric vehicles (EV) can be traced back to the 1830s. A number of pio-
neers including Anyos Jedlik, Robert Anderson and Tomas Davenport produced separately
the small-scale electric cars using non-rechargeable batteries. For a long while, EVs were
more popular than gasoline vehicles. However, due to the increasing discovery of crude oil,
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advanced technology in gasoline motors and mass production, gasoline cars started outselling
EVs in 1910.
The EV industry came back to life only after people started to pay attention to the increas-
ingly severe air pollution situation and limited fuel reserves. The recovery was rst led by
hybrid electric vehicles (HEVs). Honda Insight was released in 1999 and it was the rst mass-
produced hybrid model. Though the hybrid electric vehicle has a motor combining gas and
electric powertrain, it still relies heavily on fuel as the battery onboard can only be recharged
from gas. Then followed the plug-in hybrid vehicles (PHVs), whose representative is Chevro-
let Volt produced by GM, with Toyota and Ford models coming after. PHV uses rechargeable
batteries and can be recharged by plugging into an external electricity source. Once the stored
electricity is used up, its gasoline-powered engine is activated which also generates electricity
to recharge the battery. The battery electric vehicles (EVs) rely purely on battery power with
no backup fuel source. Tesla Roadster is the rst mass-produced highway-capable all-electric
sports car and Nissan Leaf is the rst EV produced for families.
Now most large car manufacturers6 are involved in the production of plug-in hybrid and
electric vehicles (PHEVs), which includes PHVs and EVs, and total sales of PHEVs past 1.5 mil-
lion in June 20167. However, the market share of PHEVs remains considerably small. Among
the top-10 PHEV adopting countries in 2015, while Norway and the Netherlands had a remark-
able market share of 9.74% and 22.39%, respectively8, the remaining only had market shares
ranging from 0.35% (in Canada) to 2.62% (in Sweden). This low market share could in part be
due to the prohibitively high prices of PHEVs and to the limited driving range compared to
traditional gasoline cars (Li et al., 2017), which may be improved by access to better technology.
In this paper, I focus on PHEVs, as these two types of cars can potentially benet the most
from the open source initiative of Tesla. PHEV use battery as their main energy source, which
is almost 40% of the total cost of a PHEV. Approximately 60% of Tesla’s patent is related to
the battery and charging system. Thus, the PHEVs can directly benet from the advanced
technology of Tesla, especially Tesla’s small-format battery packages, which are much cheaper
than the large-format used by other automakers. However, there are only a few suppliers
of PHEVs’ batteries and they all suer from small-scale of production and, hence, the price
remains considerably high. Larger demand for the battery and other mechanical components
could induce economies of scale of production and also lead to more intense competition
6Manufacturers as Audi, BMW, Ford, Honda, Mercedes-Benz, Mitsubishi, Nissan, Porsche, Toyota, Volkswa-
gen, and Volvo all provide at least one PHEV by 2017.
7Je Cobb, ’Global Plug-in Car Sales Cruise Past 1.5 Million’, HybridCars, 22 June 2016,
http://www.hybridcars.com/global-plug-in-car-sales-cruise-past-1-5-million/
8Je Cobb, ’Top Six Plug-in Vehicle Adopting Countries – 2015’, HybridCars, 18 January 2016,
http://www.hybridcars.com/top-six-plug-in-vehicle-adopting-countries-2015
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among suppliers. Thus, the manufacturing costs of PHEVs could eventually decrease and
as a consequence, also the prices. With lower purchase prices and the consideration of en-
vironmental issues, consumers may be more willing to buy PHEVs. The larger market size
benets all PHEV-producers, and Tesla with its advanced technology and better cars may be
in a position to gain a higher market share and obtain higher prots. In addition, as Tesla is
more familiar with its own technology, even though all other automakers use its patent and
adopt its technology, Tesla may be more ecient to produce the similar electric cars and bear
a lower production cost than its rivals as a result.
Moreover, a direct monetary cost of giving up patents is insignicant for Tesla as cross-
licensing in the auto industry is considerably rare9. The car manufacturers patent their in-
novation mostly out of the consideration of secrecy and preventing litigation rather than of
direct monetary return. Furthermore, the rms need to pay annual renewal fees to maintain
the patent and to litigate any patent infringement, which is costly and time-consuming.
1.2.2 Data
My data cover the automobile industry in the U.S. from 2012 to 2017 and come from a variety
of sources. The monthly sales (in quantity) of essentially all PHEV models marketed in the US
from January 2012 to December 2017 come from hybridcars.com. I complement these with sales
data from WardsAuto U.S. light vehicle sales, which covers conventional cars (and a portion
of the PHEVs) from January 2012 until August 2015. I aggregate the sales data at the quarter
level.
I obtain the physical attributes and manufacturer’s suggested retail price of each baseline
car model from MSNAutos websites via web-scrapping, where the data are provided by JATO
Dynamics. Prices are in 2012 dollars. The physical attributes are size, horsepower per weight,
range on highway, fuel economy, cargo volume and a dummy variable for whether navigation
is standard equipment. Another dummy variable for whether a car is a PHEV is constructed by
checking the fuel type. Size is dened as length times width, which measures the "footprint"
of a vehicle. Horsepower per weight provides a proxy for the power of the engine/motor.
Range on highway is the maximum distance a conventional car can reach on highway with
its tank fully lled, or a EV fully charged. For PHV, it is the combination of the range with
gasoline/diesel and the range with electricity. Fuel economy is dened as miles per gallon
(MPG) for conventional cars, as miles per gallon-equivalent electricity (MPGe) for EVs, and as
9Steve Brachmann, ’Ford patent licensing announcement may signal end of NIH bias in auto industry’,
IPWatchdog, 9 June 2015, http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2015/06/09/ford-patent-licensing-end-of-nih/id=58476/
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combined MPG and MPGe for PHVs, i.e. total range/ (range with gasoline/MPG + range with
electricity/MPGe)10.
In addition to those standard physical characteristics, I use APEAL (Automotive Perfor-
mance, Execution and Layout), a survey from JD-Power, and an owner satisfaction survey
from Consumer Reports to construct a subjective measure of consumers evaluation of perfor-
mance and design (PD) for each model. In both surveys, consumer are asked to give opinions
regarding driving experience, comfort, styling, and the entertainment system. More speci-
cally, the evaluation captures how consumers enjoy the acceleration of the car, whether the
seats are comfortable, whether they can easily control the navigation/audio system, etc. This
measure ranges from 1 to 5.
I combine the sales data with the price and characteristics (physical and subjective) to
construct my nal datasets. The rst dataset contains observations of both conventional cars
and PHEVs from 2012Q1 to 2015Q2. I use this part of the data to identify the price sensitivity
and the taste parameters that the consumers attach with each characteristic, when consumers
make purchase decision with both conventional cars and PHEVs in their choice set. The
inclusion of the data of conventional cars gives more variation on sales and characteristics,
and hence, allow me to obtain more accurate result in estimating the taste parameters.
The second dataset only contains information of PHEVs from the year 2012 to the year 2017.
I assume that consumers evaluate the characteristics in the same fashion among conventional
cars and PHEVs, and those evaluations are consistent throughout the year 2012 to the year
2017. Under these assumptions, I apply the evaluation of characteristics obtained from the rst
dataset on the PHEVs and form the quality measure of each model. In this way, I obtain the
evolution of each PHEV’s quality and, hence, the development of the whole PHEV industry. I
use this dataset to perform the analysis of the dynamic supply side, where PHEVs make entry
and investment decisions.
Table 1.1 shows the average sales-weighted prices and characteristics of conventional cars,
PHVs and EVs from the rst dataset. I consider the combination of a model-quarter as an
observation. In total, I obtain 3159 observations with 278 distinct car models, including 10
PHVs and 13 EVs. As shown in table 1.1, the main dierences between the conventional cars
and PHEVs are prices, fuel economy and driving range on highway. PHEVs have relatively
higher prices and shorter maximal range than the conventional ones, while conventional
cars have very low fuel eciency. The power of all types of cars, which is represented by
Horsepower/weight, and subjective measure of performance and design (PD) do not seem
signicantly dierent from one to another.
10In some cases information on fuel economy and maximum driving range on highway were missing,. In
these cases I collected them manually from Fueleconomy.gov.
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Table 1.1: Comparison of average (sales-weighted) characteristics
Price HP/Weight MPG(e) Range (Highway) PD
Gasoline/Diesel Obs: 2965
Mean 24.88 0.57 2.51 5.00 3.28
Std 9.92 0.11 0.60 0.81 0.90
Min 10.85 0.36 1.2 2.9 1
Max 114.2 1.89 5 9.5 5
Plug-in Hybrid Obs: 80
Mean 35.97 0.44 4.18 4.68 3.88
Std 11.57 0.08 0.54 0.84 0.83
Min 28.84 0.39 2.23 3.3 3
Max 132.43 1.03 5.05 5.7 5
Electric Obs: 114
Mean 39.98 0.49 10.72 1.12 3.44
Std 15.54 0.22 1.08 0.49 0.61
Min 22.11 0.25 7.6 0.62 2
Max 67.81 0.81 12.4 2.08 4
Price is in $1000, HP/Weight is horsepower per 10 lbs., MPG(e) is tens of miles per gallon,
Range (Highway) is in 100 miles, PD is performance and design.
Table 1.2 shows the evolution of the PHEV industry from beginning of 2012 to the end
of 2017. In the rst panel, I present the average sales-weighted prices and characteristics of
PHVs. The prices uctuate within the range of $35,000 to $37,000 with an increasing standard
deviation, indicating the variety of available PHVs increases over time. Horsepower/weight
and range on highway both show an increasing trend, while miles per gallon decreases slightly.
The second panel shows the changes in prices and characteristics of EVs. Prices increase over
time and all characteristics experience some improvements. It is also noticeable, that there are
new entrants every year in both categories, while there are very few exiting PHEVs.
Table 1.3 gives a comparison among PHVs and among EVs before and after open source.
I show the average (sales-weighted) characteristics and prices within 10 periods before and
after the announcement of the open source initiative. The rst two columns in category
PHV presents the characteristics of the PHV models that are in the industry before the open
source initiative, which I refer to as PHV incumbent. The comparison between these two
columns shows how the same models change their characteristics over time. The PHV incum-
bents experience a price drop after open source with all characteristics, except fuel economy
(MPG/MPGe) and subjective measure on performance and design, improves slightly. In the
third column are the PHV entrants, which are the PHVs introduced in the market after open
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Table 1.2: Average (Sales-Weighted) Characteristics for PHEVs, 2012-2017
Plug-in Hybrid 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Price 36.1 35.8 34.9 35.7 37.1 35.4
(3.43) (4.07) (10.3) (11.9) (13.0) (13.5)
Horsepower/Weight 0.41 0.43 0.46 0.47 0.50 0.50
(0.031) (0.049) (0.093) (0.09) (0.10) (0.13)
Miles Per Gallon 4.29 4.21 4.15 3.92 3.91 4.14
(0.53) (0.49) (0.56) (0.54) (0.79) (0.98)
Range on Highway 4.43 4.68 4.84 4.76 4.86 5.11
(0.79) (0.83) (0.83) (0.83) (0.82) (1.09)
No. PHV Model 3 7 10 14 18 24
Entry 2 4 3 4 5 7
Exit 0 0 0 0 1 1
Electric 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Price (in $1000) 39.2 41.0 39.6 44.3 50.2 48.6
(8.74) (14.6) (16.6) (17.5) (18.6) (17.3)
Horsepower/Weight 0.41 0.53 0.48 0.55 0.54 0.55
(0.20) (0.23) (0.21) (0.22) (0.14) (0.13)
MPG/MPGe 9.87 10.5 10.9 10.8 10.4 10.5
(0.48) (1.08) (1.07) (1.16) (1.16) (1.20)
Range on Highway 1.09 1.01 1.21 1.37 1.57 1.77
(0.75) (0.31) (0.54) (0.57) (0.58) (0.56)
No. EV Model 6 9 12 12 13 16
Entry 4 3 4 1 1 3
Exit 0 0 1 1 0 0
Price is in $1000, HP/Weight is horsepower per 10 lbs., MPG(e) is tens of miles per gallon,
Range (Highway) is in 100 miles.
source. Compared to column one, the PHV entrants enter with signicantly higher prices, but
also provide overall better congurations. I divide EVs into three groups following the same
classication: EV incumbents before open source, EV incumbents after open source and the
EV entrants. Among EV incumbents, I observe an increase in prices and that characteristics
evolution shares a similar trend as the PHVs, with range on highway increasing substantially.
EV entrants also enter with higher prices but overall better qualities.
Total sales of both PHV incumbents and EV incumbents decrease, even though the observed
physical characteristics becomes overall better. The fall in sales of incumbents may be driven
by the decreased subjective evaluation on performance and design, as well as the ercer
competition in the product market. I observe more entrants in PHVs, while less in EVs. Exit
is only observed after open source.
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Table 1.3: Comparison of Characteristics Before and After Open Source
PHV EV
Incumbents Entrants Incumbents Entrants
Before OS After OS After OS Before OS After OS After OS
average (sales-weighted) characteristics
Price 35.23 32.33 45.11 40.19 45.61 52.72
(5.91) (6.99) (18.20) (14.68) (17.48) (19.12)
Size 1.26 1.32 1.47 1.28 1.28 1.41
(0.06) (0.08) (0.15) (0.20) (0.23) (0.22)
Horsepower/weight 0.43 0.46 0.56 0.49 0.55 0.52
(0.05) (0.06) (0.15) (0.22) (0.18) (0.12)
Range on highway 4.66 4.83 5.13 1.07 1.45 1.76
(0.82) (0.78) (1.09) (0.48) (0.58) (0.55)
MPG/MPGe 4.24 4.16 3.60 10.51 10.68 10.32
(0.53) (0.38) (1.21) (1.03) (1.16) (1.18)
Performance and design 4.1 3.16 3.7 3.6 3.27 4.1
(0.82) (0.65) (0.65) (0.52) (0.95) (0.41)
Total Sales 116,777 44,923 108,425 90,331 48,712 153,992
Entry 6 12 8 5
Exit 0 1 0 2
No. Model 7 17 10 13
1.3 Model
I build my dynamic structural model on the work of Ericson and Pakes (1995). There are
maximum N plug-in hybrid and electric vehicles being active in the industry. PHEVs are
dierentiated by quality levels ωj . Time is discrete with innite horizon and PHEVs discount
the future at the rate β = 0.925. In each period, the sequence of events unfolds as follows:
rst, potential PHEV entrants observe the private random entry costs and decide on entry.
Simultaneously, one of the lowest-quality PHEV incumbents may face an exogenous shock
and exit the industry. Then, the remaining PHEV incumbents receive choice-specic shocks
on investment and make decisions on whether to invest or not. Third, PHEV incumbents
compete with conventional cars in the product market and collect prots. Finally, both entry
and investment decisions are carried out at the end of the period and state (quality) of PHEVs
evolves accordingly.
I discuss these components in turn.
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1.3.1 Demand
I specify demand using a discrete-choice model (Berry, 1994), where consumers can choose
among a PHEV, a conventional car or an outside option, which includes not purchasing a car
or purchasing a car outside of the 278 models considered. Let uij denote the utility consumer
i receives from purchasing car model j:
uij =
H∑
h=1
αhzhj − α0pj + ηj + ij, (1.1)
where zhj represents the h-th car observable characteristics (discussed in section 1.2.2), pj is
the price, ηj is an unobserved product characteristics, and ij is an idiosyncratic taste shock
following a Type-I Extreme Value distribution. These shocks are independently and identically
distributed across consumers and products. I assume each consumer purchases at most one
car in each period (Berry et al., 1995; Petrin, 2002; Beresteanu and Li, 2011). The utility from
the outside option ui0 is normalized to be zero. I use data from 2012Q1 to 2015Q3, which
contains both information of conventional cars and PHEVs to identify the taste parameters
αh and price parameter α0.
Similar to Fan (2013), I dene each car’s absolute quality as
qj =
H∑
h=1
αhzhj + ηj. (1.2)
In this way, I simplify the cars’ heterogeneity from several dimensions to only one. I further
follow Goettler and Gordon (2011) and discretize the absolute quality qj into quality levels
denoted by ωj . These are state variables of each car, that enter the dynamic model. I discuss
this in more details in section 1.5.1.
Consumers choose the cars give them the highest utility. The market share of car model j
is given by
sj =
exp(qj − α0pj)
1 +
∑
ωk 6=0 exp(qk − α0pk)
. (1.3)
1.3.2 Supply of Incumbents
Each car manufacturer can sell multiple car models. The prot of a multi-product manufacturer
f , who is in the market, is given by
pif (p, q,ω) =
∑
j∈Jf
pij(p, q,ω) =
∑
j∈Jf
sj(p, q)M [pj − cj(ω)], (1.4)
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where Jf is the set of cars that manufacturer f provides, p is the vector of prices, q is the
vector of qualities, ω is the vector of quality levels, sj(p, q) is given by equation 1.4 and M
is the market size. Market size is dened as the number of household in the whole US of that
period less the number of registered car in the last period.
The marginal cost of car model j is given by
cj(ω) =
γ0ωj + υj if j is conventional car,γ0ωj + γ1(∑Nj=1 1(PHEVj = 1)) + υj if j is PHEV. (1.5)
For both conventional cars and PHEVs, the marginal cost depends on the quality levels ωj . For
the PHEVs, the cost additionally depends on the total number of active PHEVs in the market,
where γ1 measures the eect of economies of scale. The υj is an unobserved component (for
econometrician), which also aects the manufacturing cost.
In order to maximize the overall prot, a multi-product manufacturer sets the prices to
satisfy the rst-order conditions
∂pif
∂pj
= M
sj + ∑
k∈Jf
(pk − ck(ω)) ∂sk(p, q,ω)
∂pj
 = 0 for all j ∈ Jf . (1.6)
In the dynamic supply side of the model, PHEVs may change their qualities depending on
their investment decisions. Investment is a discrete choice xtj ∈ {0, 1}. PHEV incumbents
make their investment decisions after observing private choice-specic shocks, φtj(xtj), which
are independent and identically distributed according to the Type I extreme value distribution.
PHEV j obtains a per-period payo
p˜itj(ω
t) + C(ωj)x
t
j + φ
t
j(x
t
j), (1.7)
where p˜itj(ωt) is the maximized prot from the static product market competition and C(ωj)
denotes the state-dependent investment cost, which is paid only if the PHEV j decided to
invest. I specify the investment cost as
C(ωj) = c¯ ω
2
i (1.8)
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Conditional on investing, PHEVs face stochastic investment outcomes τ tj = {0, 1, 2}, mean-
ing the quality of a PHEV can stay the same, increase by one unit or increase by two units,
respectively. Those outcomes take place with the following probabilities:
p(τ tj = 2|xtj = 1) = p2 + λ21(OSj = 1), (1.9)
p(τ tj = 1|xtj = 1) = p1 + λ11(OSj = 1), (1.10)
p(τ tj = 0|xtj = 1) = 1− p(τ tj = 1|xtj = 1)− p(τ tj = 2|xtj = 1), (1.11)
where OSj indicates that PHEV j belongs to the open-source rm Tesla, and λ1, λ2 are pa-
rameters to estimate that allow an innovation advantage of the open source rm. If a PHEV
decides not to invest, then the quality drops by one with probability one in the next period.
Once the investment outcomes are realized, the state evolves according to:
ωt+1j = ω
t
j + τ
t
j1(x
t
j = 1)− 1(xtj = 0). (1.12)
I assumed when a PHEV already reaches the highest possible quality level, it can no longer
have a successful investment and when a PHEV has the lowest quality level, it will no longer
suer a quality drop even if it does not invest. I make these assumptions to avoid explosion
of the state space.
1.3.3 Potential Entrants
PHEVs with zero quality level are considered as potential entrants. In each period, I allow ve
potential PHEV entrants with randomly drawn quality levels to arrive11. Let φ(e)tj denote the
private random entry cost of potential PHEV entrant j in period t. Entry costs are indepen-
dently and identically distributed across potential PHEV entrants and periods according to a
distribution F e(·). An entry decision is denoted as
χtj(ω
t, φ
(e)t
j ) ∈ {0, 1}, (1.13)
where χtj(ωt, φ
(e)t
j ) = 1 indicates that potential entrant j draws entry cost φ
(e)t
j and decides
to enter the market, given the industry state is ωt, and χtj(ωt, φ
(e)t
j ) = 0 otherwise. However,
entrant j will not participate in the product market competition at time t, but use this whole
period to set up the production line with payment φ(e)tj and become an incumbent in the next
period t+ 1. It also cannot make investment decision in this period. Unlike the incumbents,
11The assumption on the amount of potential entrants is motivated by data. I observe on average two entrants
per period, with the maximum being four.
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potential entrants are short-lived and do not take the discounted future return into account.
If potential entrants do not enter the industry, they receive nothing and vanish. As entry cost
is private information, the entry decision of a potential PHEV entrant is viewed as random by
its rivals. Therefore, I formulate
ξ
(e)t
j (ω
t) ≡ prob(χtj(ωt, φ(e)tj ) = 1) =
∫
χtj(ω
t, φ
(e)t
j )dF
e(φej) (1.14)
to represent the probability that a potential PHEV entrant j enters the market with the industry
state ωt.
1.3.4 Exit
I assume exit is an exogenous event, which is motivated by rare exit occurrence that I observe
in the data. The constant probability of such an event taking place is denoted as ψ. Only
the incumbents with the lowest quality may face this event. Furthermore, I assume only one
incumbent can exit in each period. If more than one incumbent has the lowest-quality level,
each of them exits with the same probability. For instance, if there are four incumbents in
quality level one, then each of them has a probability of ψ/4 to exit. Furthermore, I assume
that any PHEV will only leave the market after at least 10 periods.
1.3.5 Equilibrium
In each period t, PHEV j makes entry, investment and pricing decisions to maximize its
discounted future returns. PHEVs anticipate the product market competition when they make
entry and investment decisions, as the states (qualities) are publicly observable.
Let V tj (ωt, φtj) denote the value function of incumbent PHEV j:
V tj (ω
t, φtj) = max
xtj∈{0,1}
{
p˜itj(ω
t) + C(ωj)x
t
j + φ
t
j(x
t
j) (1.15)
+ βE{V t+1j (ωt+1, φt+1j )|ωt, ωt+1j 6= 0, xtj(ωt), xt−j(ωt), ξt−j(ωt)}
}
where p˜itj(ωt) is the maximized prot from the static product market competition, C denotes
the investment cost, φtj(xtj) is the investment-choice-specic shock, ξt−j(ωt) and xt−j(ωt) rep-
resent the entry and investment decisions of competitors.
Potential PHEV entrants must weigh the benets of entering against their draws of entry
costs. They face the similar value function except the fact that they do not have per-period
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payo and do not make investments in the period that they enter. Let V (e)tj (ω(e)t, φ
(e)t
j ) denote
the value function of potential entrant j:
V
(e)t
j (ω
t, φ
(e)t
j ) = max
χ
(e)t
j ∈{0,1}
{
χ
(e)t
j (1.16)(
− φ(e)tj + βE{V (e)t+1j (ωt+1, φ(e)t+1j )|ωt, ωt+1j 6= 0, ξ(e)t−j (ωt), x(e)t−j (ωt)}
)}
where χ(e)tj is entry choice and φ
(e)t
j is the random entry cost.
I assume PHEVs use symmetric strategies that depend solely on the current industry state
and their randomly drawn entry costs/choice-specic shocks, leading to a Markov-Perfect
Nash Equilibrium (Ericson and Pakes, 1995; Maskin and Tirole, 1988).
Let σj denote the strategy used by PHEV j, which represents entry decisions of potential
entrants and investment decisions of incumbents. MPNE requires that each PHEV’s strategy
is optimal given the strategies of its competitors:
Vj(ω, φj;σj, σ−j) ≥ Vj(ω, φj;σ′, σ−j), (1.17)
for all PHEV j, all states ω, all shocks φ and all possible alternative strategies σ′. The pri-
vate shocks guarantee that at least one equilibrium in pure strategies exists (Doraszelski and
Satterthwaite, 2010).
1.4 Estimation
Following Bajari et al. (2007), I estimate the parameters in two steps. In the rst stage, I
recover the parameters of the static demand part and estimate the equilibrium policy functions.
More specically, I 1) estimate taste parameters based on consumers’ purchase decisions (see
equation 1.1) and construct the discretized quality level for each car model using those estimates
(see equation 1.2), 2) infer marginal costs from the car model’s rst-order condition for optimal
pricing (see equation 1.6), and 3) estimate state transition parameters and policy functions
that characterize the investment and entry behavior of car models conditional on their own
state and the industry state (see equation 1.9).
In the second step, I recover the investment cost and the entry cost by imposing the optimal-
ity condition of the PHEV’s investment and entry decisions (see equation 1.17). I 1) forward
simulate industry paths based on the theoretical model and use the estimates obtained from
the rst step to construct equilibrium value functions, and 2) nd the parameters such that
protable deviations from the estimated optimal policies are minimized.
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1.4.1 First stage estimation
Consumer demand and quality
In order to back out the taste parameter of each characteristics of cars, I estimate the following
equation
ln(sjt)− ln(s0t) =
H∑
h=1
αhzhjt − α0pjt + ηjt, (1.18)
where sj is the market share of the car model j given in equation 1.3 and s0 is the market
share of the outside good. In addition to the physical attributes and the subjective measure
on performance and design, I also include brand dummies to control for the xed eect of car
manufacturers and use time trend variables to control for the industry-wide time xed-eects.
The latter one capture the development of PHEV-specic infrastructure as well12.
If car manufacturers know the values of the unobserved product characteristics ηjt, even
though we as econometrician do not, then prices are likely to be correlated with them. In
order to control for these potential correlation, I use the set of instruments proposed by Berry
et al. (1995). These BLP instruments include characteristics of the interested car itself, the
sum of characteristics of the models produced by the same manufacturer (exclude itself) and
the sum of characteristics of the models from rival brands. I classify all car models into their
market segments and performed these operations within segments for additional variation.
The intuition of these instruments are from the pricing behavior: car models that have close
substitutes will tend to have low markups and car manufacturer respond dierently to own
and to rivals’ products.
The absolute quality is dened as the sum of observed characteristics weighted by the taste
parameter and unobserved quality, as shown in equation 1.2. I then discretize them into quality
level ωj .
Marginal cost
Multi-product car manufacturers choose the set of prices to maximize their overall prots as
described in equation 1.6. I rst dene a J by J matrix ∆, where the (j, k) element is given by
∆jk =
{ −∂sk
∂pj
, if k and j are produced by the same manufacturer;
0, otherwise.
(1.19)
12I also added the number of PHEV charging stations to capture this PHEV-specic infrastructure eect.
However, the estimate shows that the eect is already nicely picked up by the time trend variable. Thus, that
specication is not included.
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Solving for the rst-order conditions gives:
cj = pj −∆(p,ω)−1s(p,ω) (1.20)
Then, I parameterize these inferred costs to quantify the impact of quality level and the eect
of economies of scale on production costs:
cj(ω) = pj −∆(p,ω)−1s(p,ω) (1.21)
= γ0ωj + γ1(
N∑
j=1
1(PHEVj = 1)) + υj
where ωj is the quality level of car model j and the sum is the number of PHEVs in a given
time period.
As the unobservables υj can be potentially correlated with the quality level ωj , I apply the
same set of instruments as discussed in section 1.4.1.
ality transition
I use forward simulation to construct the endogenous distribution of quality levels by aggre-
gating individual car quality. The evolution of individual cars’ states and the distribution of
cars’ states are characterized by the investment policy function and the stochastic investment
outcome.
Investment and entry policy functions
The investment decision depends not only on own PHEV’s quality level, but also on the the
distribution of quality levels of the whole industry. The distribution is described by a vector
of numbers, indicating how many rival models are in a given quality range. I nonparametricly
estimate the investment decision.
Similar as the investment decision, the entry decision also depends on the potential PHEV
entrant’s quality level and the quality distribution of the industry. I nonparametricly estimate
both the number of entrants of a given distribution of quality levels and the probability of an
entrant with a certain quality type that would enter a given industry structure.
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1.4.2 Second stage estimation: recovering the structural parameters
I follow the methodology proposed by Bajari et al. (2007) and use forward simulation to estimate
the investment cost and entry cost distribution. I rst construct the ex-ante equilibrium value
function, before its private shocks are realized, as
V (σ, θ) = E
[ ∞∑
t=0
βt(p˜itj(ω
t)− C(ωj)xtj(ωt) + φt(xtj))|ω0
]
, (1.22)
where σ is the estimated investment policy function, p˜itj(ωt) is the equilibrium prot from
demand market, ωt is the distribution of quality levels in period t, C(ωj) = c¯ ω2i is the in-
vestment cost and ω0 is the quality level of the interested car model at the rst period of the
forward simulation.
Then, I follow Bajari et al. (2007) by rewriting the value function as the inner product of
two vectors and get
V (σ, θ) = E
[ ∞∑
t=0
βt [p˜itj(ω
t) ω2i x
t
j(ω
t) φt(xtj)]|ω0
]
· θ
=
[
E[
∞∑
t=0
βtp˜itj(ω
t)|ω0] E[
∞∑
t=0
βtω2i x
t
j(ω
t)|ω0] E[
∞∑
t=0
βtφt(xtj)|ω0]
]
· θ
= [W 1 W 2 W 3] · θ,
where θ = [1 c¯ 1]. W 1,W 2 are generated according to the demand estimation and estimation
of the investment policy function. Using the same formula, I obtain the perturbed value
functions by perturbing the policy function, denoted as V (σ′, θ) =
[
W˜ 1 W˜ 2 W˜ 3
]
· θ, where
σ′ is the perturbed investment behavior.
Finally, I use a minimum distance estimator to determine the unit investment cost that
satises V (σ, θ) ≥ V (σ′, θ),∀σ′.
θˆ = arg min
θ
1
n
∑
(min{(V (σ, θ)− V ′(σ′, θ)), 0})2
.
After the investment cost is estimated, I compute the ex-ante value functions for all potential
entrants in dierent industry structures and estimate the entry probability following the rst-
stage estimation. In this way, I infer the entry cost distribution by observing the value of
potential entrants that indeed enter.
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1.5 Results
In this section, I discuss the results from the rst- and second-stage estimation. I start by
providing the taste parameters from the demand side, and present the constructed quality
levels of each PHEV model. The marginal cost is recovered from the rst-order condition of
the PHEV producers, and I then show the relationship between the costs and the quality levels.
Then, I discuss my results for the quality level transition probabilities, exogenous exit rates
and the policy functions both pre- and post- open source initiative.
For the second stage, I rst present the investment cost estimated from the simulated value
function and the optimality condition of the players’ investment problem. Then, I show the
distribution of entry costs with the help of the estimated policy functions and the estimated
investment cost.
1.5.1 First-stage estimates
Demand estimates
The estimation results of the taste parameters are shown in table 1.4 using the instrument
described in section 1.4.1. In the rst three specications, I use dierent ways to capture the
time xed eect. I use year dummies in the rst specication, while in the second and third
ones I use quarter-level time trend variable and year-level time trend variable, respectively. The
results show that the estimates of taste parameters remain almost unchanged across dierent
specications. Overall, the parameters have the expected signs. The coecients for price and
PHEV dummies are negative and signicant. Consumers dislike to pay more for their cars and
the negative estimate of PHEV dummy indicates the reluctant attitude towards PHEV, even
taking the higher fuel economy and shorter driving range into account. The coecient signs
for product characteristics are all positive. That shows consumers prefer cars with larger size,
higher engine/motor power, higher fuel eciency, larger cargo capacity and longer driving
range. Consumers also like navigation as standard equipment and cars with nicer design and
better performance.
In the last two specications, I use PHV and EV dummies separately instead of using only
one PHEV dummy. The results show that once I separate those two dummies, the positive
eect of MPG/MPGe on consumer utilities vanishes. The reason is that EVs usually have
substantially higher MPGe than the PHVs and conventional cars. The estimate for EV dummy
captures then not only the consumers’ attitude towards this type of car, but also the preference
on fuel economy, yielding a biased result. Thus, I should not use the separate dummies.
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Table 1.4: Demand Estimation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Price -0.134∗∗∗ -0.136∗∗∗ -0.135∗∗∗ -0.134∗∗∗ -0.133∗∗∗
(0.0120) (0.0121) (0.0119) (0.0122) (0.0120)
Size (L*W) 5.128∗∗∗ 5.208∗∗∗ 5.142∗∗∗ 4.797∗∗∗ 4.742∗∗∗
(0.475) (0.480) (0.473) (0.552) (0.546)
Horsepower/Weight 1.286∗∗∗ 1.337∗∗∗ 1.303∗∗∗ 1.201∗∗∗ 1.174∗∗∗
(0.351) (0.355) (0.351) (0.365) (0.361)
MPG/MPGe 0.0973∗∗∗ 0.0929∗∗∗ 0.0949∗∗∗ -0.0167 -0.0162
(0.0350) (0.0352) (0.0351) (0.0630) (0.0628)
Cargo Volume 0.251∗∗∗ 0.252∗∗∗ 0.250∗∗∗ 0.238∗∗∗ 0.237∗∗∗
(0.0353) (0.0357) (0.0354) (0.0357) (0.0354)
Navigation 1.068∗∗∗ 1.091∗∗∗ 1.068∗∗∗ 1.055∗∗∗ 1.038∗∗∗
(0.170) (0.173) (0.170) (0.174) (0.171)
Range on Highway 0.194∗∗∗ 0.187∗∗∗ 0.191∗∗∗ 0.249∗∗∗ 0.253∗∗∗
(0.0416) (0.0416) (0.0414) (0.0543) (0.0539)
Overall Performance and Design 0.196∗∗∗ 0.197∗∗∗ 0.195∗∗∗ 0.200∗∗∗ 0.199∗∗∗
(0.0265) (0.0267) (0.0265) (0.0265) (0.0264)
PHEV -1.560∗∗∗ -1.530∗∗∗ -1.553∗∗∗
(0.250) (0.252) (0.250)
time trend (quarter) -0.0126∗∗ -0.0123∗∗
(0.00582) (0.00573)
time trend (year) -0.0496∗∗ -0.0480∗∗
(0.0228) (0.0225)
PHV -1.474∗∗∗ -1.492∗∗∗
(0.253) (0.251)
EV -0.424 -0.433
(0.588) (0.587)
Constant -14.42∗∗∗ -14.45∗∗∗ -14.40∗∗∗ -13.92∗∗∗ -13.88∗∗∗
(0.473) (0.475) (0.470) (0.578) (0.572)
year dummies Yes No No No No
brand dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3159 3159 3159 3159 3159
Adjusted R2 0.351 0.344 0.350 0.352 0.357
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
I use specication (2) for the further estimation of the dynamic model, as it accounts for all
possible forces accurately.
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ality levels and quality changes
After constructing the PHEV quality as the sum of characteristics and their corresponding
taste estimates, I discretize the quality into six quality levels. The cutos are 25 percentile,
50 percentile, 75 percentile, 85 percentile, and 95 percentile. I choose those cutos to ensure
that car models in each quality level will have more or less the same probabilities to perform
successful investment. As lower quality cars are easier to improve than the high-end cars, I
impose larger quality intervals for the rst three levels than the last three13.
Table 1.5 shows the distributions of PHEV models before and after Tesla’s open source
initiative. I nd a signicant increase in the number of PHEVs in high-quality groups after
open source. That could be driven by two dierent reasons: 1)Tesla’s shared technology helps
to remove entry barriers for potential entrants with higher quality, or 2) rivals invest more
due to the decreased investment cost induced by open source movement and move to higher
quality levels.
Table 1.5: Quality Levels
Before OS After OS Total
Freq. Percent Freq. Percent Freq. Percent
0 33 28.70 90 23.75 123 24.90
1 27 23.48 98 25.86 125 25.30
2 37 32.17 86 22.69 123 24.90
3 8 6.96 41 10.82 49 9.92
4 8 6.96 42 11.08 50 10.12
5 2 1.74 22 5.80 24 4.86
Total 115 100.00 379 100.00 494 100.00
Tables 1.6 and 1.7 show the transitions between quality levels before and after open source,
conditional on investing. Quality levels of the current period are on the vertical axis, whereas
the quality levels of the next period are displayed on the horizontal side. The number indicates
how many car models’ qualities remain the same or increase after investing. As assumed, if a
player invests, then its quality level can either improve or remain the same. Thus, there are
only positive numbers above the diagonal. The comparison between these two tables shows
that low-quality cars have a higher success rate of investment before open source, while high-
quality cars have a higher success rate after open source. As Tesla produces only high-quality
cars, it suggests that the closer the rivals are with Tesla, the stronger the spillover eect is
from open source.
13I experimented with dierent cut-o points.
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Table 1.6: Transition matrix conditional on Investment (Before OS)
Quality Next Period
Quality 1 2 3 4 5 6 Total
Freq./(Perc.) Freq./(Perc.) Freq./(Perc.) Freq./(Perc.) Freq./(Perc.) Freq./(Perc.) Freq./(Perc.)
1 28 4 1 0 0 0 33
(84.85) (12.12) (3.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (100.00)
2 0 16 7 1 0 0 24
(0.00) (66.67) (29.17) (4.17) (0.00) (0.00) (100.00)
3 0 0 29 2 1 0 32
(0.00) (0.00) (90.63) (6.25) (3.13) (0.00) (100.00)
4 0 0 0 5 1 0 6
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (83.33) (16.67) (0.00) (100.00)
5 0 0 0 0 7 1 8
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (87.50) (12.50) (100.00)
6 0 0 0 0 0 2 2
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (100.00) (100.00)
Table 1.7: Transition matrix conditional on Investment (After OS)
Quality Next Period
Quality 1 2 3 4 5 6 Total
Freq./(Perc.) Freq./(Perc.) Freq./(Perc.) Freq./(Perc.) Freq./(Perc.) Freq./(Perc.) Freq./(Perc.)
1 62 11 1 0 0 0 74
(83.78) (14.86) (1.35) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (100.00)
2 0 63 11 1 0 0 75
(0.00) (84.00) (14.67) (1.33) (0.00) (0.00) (100.00)
3 0 0 57 9 0 0 66
(0.00) (0.00) (86.36) (13.64) (0.00) (0.00) (100.00)
4 0 0 0 22 7 0 29
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (75.86) (24.14) (0.00) (100.00)
5 0 0 0 0 26 6 32
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (81.25) (18.75) (100.00)
6 0 0 0 0 0 15 15
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (100.00) (100.00)
Marginal cost
After I obtain the taste parameter estimates and construct the quality levels, I back out the
marginal cost of each car model. Recall that marginal cost of a PHEV is computed as: c(ω) =
γ0ωj + γ1(
∑N
j=1 1(PHEVj = 1)) + υj . The estimation results are in table 1.8.
The rst two columns show the results from OLS estimation, while the last two columns
introduce instruments to account for endogeneity of prices. Controlling for brand xed eects,
higher quality yields higher marginal cost, which is intuitive. And the coecient of the number
of active players in the industry (γ1) being negative conrms the existence of the economies
of scales eect.
25
Table 1.8: Marginal Cost
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS IV
Quality 6.069∗∗∗ 5.966∗∗∗ 4.547∗∗∗ 4.706∗∗∗
(0.367) (0.365) (0.578) (0.518)
No. PHEV Model -0.125∗∗∗ -0.158∗∗∗
(0.0420) (0.0288)
Constant 13.02∗∗∗ 17.18∗∗∗ 16.99∗∗∗ 21.32∗∗∗
(2.572) (2.905) (1.826) (2.058)
Brand dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 484 484 429 429
Adjusted R2 0.867 0.869 0.879 0.885
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
State transitions and policy functions
The state transition probabilities are determined by the success rates. PHEVs can enjoy at
most two units of improvement in quality, conditional on investing. The estimation results are
shown in table 1.9. These results suggest that the success rates of both one-unit and two-unit
improvement do not dier prior to the open source initiative and after14. Tesla does have a
premium on one-unit quality improvements before open source, but afterwards, this premium
fades away. For the probability of two-unit improvements, Tesla does not dier signicantly
from its rivals.
I do not observe any exits before Tesla’s open source event. Therefore, the exit probability
is simply zero, which is in line with the assumption that player will only leave the market after
at least 10 periods, which corresponds to two and a half years. After open source, each player
faces an exogenous exit probability of 7.7%, if she is active in the industry for more than 10
periods.
I use local linear nonparametric regressions to estimate the policy functions, i.e. the in-
vestment decisions of the incumbents and the entry decisions of the potential entrants. The
regressors in both cases are the focal player’s quality level and the quality level distribution
of the rivals. For example, a vector of regressors of [3,4,7,2,0,0,0] indicates the focal player is
in quality level 3, four of her rivals are in quality level 1, seven of them are in quality level 2
and two of them are in quality level 3. Whereas there are no players in quality levels 4 to 7.
Due to the extremely large number of possible industry structures in my exercise, I cannot
14For now, I assume high-quality and low-quality players have the same success rates for the reason of
tractability.
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Table 1.9: Transition
Before OS After OS
Est. SD Est. SD
Prob. of one-unit 0.1639 0.0384 0.1577 0.0134
quality improvement
Prob. of two-unit 0.0109 0.0064 0.0082 0.0057
quality improvement
Tesla’s Premium on 0.2536 0.1569 0.0329 0.1030
one-unit improvment
Tesla’s Premium on -0.0083 0.0089 0.0193 0.0498
two-unit improvment
Exit prob. - - 0.0863 0.0149
The standard deviations are conducted by bootstrapping.
predict investment and entry probability of all possible states. In gure 1.1, I show the pre-
dicted investment probabilities of each PHEV in randomly selected 500 industry structures.
The blue line shows the investment probabilities without open source, while the red dashed
line represents the choice after open source. The result shows that in general, PHEV are more
likely to invest after open source.
Figure 1.1: Comparison in Investments
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1.5.2 Second-stage estimates
In the second-stage estimation, I conduct forward simulation to obtain the equilibrium value
functions. Using the estimates from the rst stage, I compute the per-period prot of each
player. I then simulate the evolution path of the industry, where all players follow the equilib-
rium policy functions.
As shown in table 1.10, investment cost decreases after open source from $16.68 million
per quarter to $6.51 million, by almost 61%. This implies a very strong eect of technological
spillovers of Tesla on all its rivals.
Table 1.10: Investment Cost
Before OS After OS
Est. SD Est. SD
Investment cost ($ in millions) -16.68 4.368 -6.51 2.077
Standard deviation obtained by bootstrap
To determine if these estimates are reasonable, I compute the total investment cost of ve
brands: BMW, Ford, Mercedes, Tesla and Volvo based on their PHEV’s quality levels and
their investment decisions in the last quarter of 2017. The results are in table 1.11. Then I
compare the estimated total investment with reported R&D spending that I obtained from
news articles15,16,17,18 and Tesla’s annual reports. The reported R&D are on the annual level,
I assume the spending is equally divided for each quarter. For BMW and Ford, the estimated
investment costs are lower than the reported ones, as the reported R&D spending includes
not only the investment in the production of electric vehicles but also in autonomous driving.
For Mercedes-Benz, Tesla and Volvo, my estimated results are reasonably close to the reported
spending.
15Edward Taylor, ’BMW raises R&D spending for electric, autonomous cars’, Reuters, 21 March
2018, https://de.reuters.com/article/us-bmw-results-outlook/bmw-raises-rd-spending-for-electric-autonomous-
cars-idUKKBN1GX0YU.
16Matthew DeBord, ’Ford just made a $4.5 billion investment to completely transform its business’, Business
Insider, 3 January 2017, https://www.businessinsider.de/ford-45-billion-investment-autonomous-vehicles-2017-
1?r=US&IR=T.
17Steve Hanley, ’Mercedes To Bump Electric Car Investment In US By $1 Billion, Expand Partnership With
BYD’, CleanTechnica, 22 September 2017, https://cleantechnica.com/2017/09/22/mercedes-bump-electric-car-
investment-us-1-billion-expand-partnership-byd/.
18Esha Vaish, Volvo expects electric car margins to match conventional vehicles by 2025, Reuters, 20
March 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-volvocars-electric-margins/volvo-expects-electric-car-margins-
to-match-conventional-vehicles-by-2025-idUSKCN1R12DD.
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Table 1.11: Estimated investment real VS. R&D spending in 2017Q4 ($ in million)
Brand Model quality level Investment cost(with c¯ = 6.51) real R&D
BMW 330e 3 58.6233
530e 4 104.2192
740e 5 162.8425
X5 4 104.2192
i3 3 58.6233
Total 488.5275 1500
Ford C-Max Energi PHEV 2 26.0548
Focus Electric 1 6.5137
Fusion Energi PHEV 2 26.0548
Total 58.6233 225
Mercedes B-Class Electric 2 26.05
C350e 3 58.62
GLE550e 3 58.62
S550 Plug in 6 234.49
Total 377.79 250
Tesla Model 3 1 6.51
Model S 6 234.49
Model X 6 234.49
Total 475.50 344.5
Volvo S90 T8 PHEV 1 6.51
XC60 PHEV 3 58.62
XC90 T8 PHEV 4 104.22
Total 169.36 250
Figures 1.2 and 1.3 show the distribution of potential entrants’ value before and after open
source. The blue lines are the estimated values, and the red dashed lines show the 95% con-
dential intervals. The left graph shows that the potential entrants with a value lower than
approximately $550 million will not enter the industry, while the entrants with an expected
future return of $600 million will denitely enter. This allows me to infer the entry cost prior
to the open source initiative, which is distributed almost linearly between $555 million and
$595 million. The same argument goes for the right graph. The entry cost after open source is
distributed between $460 million to $520 million. These ndings suggest Tesla’s open source
initiative served to partially remove the barriers to entry to the PHEV industry.
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Figure 1.2: Before Open Source
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Figure 1.3: After Open Source
1.6 Conclusion
I propose a structural dynamic model to quantify the impact of open source on the development
of the plug-in hybrid and electric vehicle industry in the US. In particular, I estimate the xed
investment cost and entry cost distribution before and after the open source initiative of Tesla
took place. I nd the investment cost decreases after open source, which gives incentive for
PHEV makers to invest more frequently. That in turn results in producing PHEVs with higher
quality. The entry cost also becomes lower after open source, allowing more PHEV models
to enter the industry and inducing economies of scale to decrease the manufacturing cost.
Overall, my ndings suggest that open source had a positive eect on the evolution of the
PHEV industry.
The existing literature of open source provides mostly qualitative evaluation of open source,
whereas I take advantage of a structural model and am able to disentangle and quantify the
dierent forces of benets coming along with open source. The modeling and the estimation
procedure can be easily adapted in other newly emerging industries to study the benet of
open source or other kinds of information sharing behavior.
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2 Valuation of Open Source – Evidence
from the US Automobile Industry
2.1 Introduction
The evaluation of open source is a subject of increasing interest. It is a concept proposed
by the software industry and gradually adopted by other sectors. In contract to proprietary
software, everyone can use, distribute and modify the source code of an open source software.
Extended to other industries, it provides a new approach of innovation and may generate
dierent market pattern, compared to the case where there are only in-house closed source
innovations. A better understanding of the advantages and disadvantages that an open source
movement could bring to a newly emerging industry is particularly essential for policy-makers.
Previous literature focuses mainly on understanding the impact of open source on the
software industry. Papers discussing how programmer benets from open source includes
Raymond (2001), Lerner and Tirole (2002) and Roberts et al. (2006). Raymond (2001) suggests
that programmers who participate in developing open source code gain enjoyment from xing
bugs and being recognized as members of a group with intellectual curiosity. Lerner and Tirole
(2002) argue that programmers are usually both developers and end-users. As developers, they
signal their productivity in the participation of the open source project and as end-user they
benet from the improved quality or desired function of the software. Roberts et al. (2006)
nd that the clearer feedback system adopted by projects that use open source software is
positively related to the programmers’ motivation and, hence, their performance.
There is vast literature discussing how the software industry enjoys the benets brought
by open source movement. Bonaccorsi and Rossi (2003) point out that open source accelerates
the diusion of technology in the presence of network externality. Though the software is no
longer private goods and can not be the source of revenue, rms can still gain higher prot by
selling complement hardware or services to a larger group. Bessen (2005) nds that rms are
more likely to engage in open source movement, when facing sophisticated software. And that
increases social welfare as less ineciency occurs in developing such software. Harho et al.
(2003) provide the idea that an innovation revealed freely and adopted by others can become
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an informal standard. In this sense, open-source rms often join collaborations in order to
develop codes in directions that favor their own technology and gain a permanent advantage.
Lerner and Tirole (2005) suggest another benet of using open source is that making codes
available to everyone induces the sophisticated end-users to debug and to improve the quality
of the software. That directly decreases the coding cost.
Recent research tried to understand why other industries also started to adopt the open
source concept. The bio-pharmaceutical rms employ open source organizational modes to
solve complex projects. These projects require the acquisition of diverse ideas and solutions
from outsiders, and, thus, an open innovation approach may be better suited to deal with high
complexity (Chiaroni et al., 2009; Lee et al., 2019). Lee et al. (2010) suggest that SMEs engaging
in open innovation are more likely to form collaboration networks, facilitate their innovation
capabilities, and improve their innovation performance. Laursen and Salter (2006) empirically
support those arguments using the U.K. innovation survey of manufacturing rms.
In this paper, I analyze how open source contributes to the development of the plug-in
hybrid and electric vehicle industry (PHEV) in the US. Using the model and estimates from
Yan (2020), I conduct a counterfactual analysis in a world, where Tesla, a leading rm in
producing PHEVs, does not share the technology with its competitors. In particular, I am
interested in evaluating how the reduction in investment cost and entry cost induced by open
source aect the industry structure and the monetary returns of the PHEV manufacturers.
That further allows me to explore the reason why Tesla proposes the open source initiative in
the rst place.
On the one hand, PHEVs are more willing to invest and to reach better qualities with the
decreased investment costs after open source occurs. They would then have higher prots,
as PHEVs are competing on the qualities in the product market. On the other hand, lower
entry costs allow more competitors to enter the industry. Facing ercer competition, they
may attract fewer consumers and cannot gain as much prot as prior to open source initiative.
Depending on which of these two countervailing eects is stronger, PHEV would form dierent
expectations of future returns and make dierent choices in terms of entry and investment.
These decisions will, in turn, determine the future market structure.
In my analysis, I shut down the benets that open source movement brings and let the
PHEVs make the strategic choices accordingly. That is, after the third quarter of 2014, at
which point the open source initiative actually occurs, I force the players in the market to face
the higher entry costs and unit investment cost as estimated before the open source event. I
forward simulate the PHEV industry development until the last quarter of 2017, which is the
last period captured in my data. Then I am able to compare the market structure documented
in the data with the one generated by the counterfactual analysis. For market structure, I
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am interested in not only the number of distinct PHEVs, but also the overall market share.
Furthermore, I can compute the discounted return for all PHEV players, which consist of
investment expenditure, prots from selling their cars and entry expenditure.
However, the forward simulation I apply here requires investment costs and entry costs
both remain at the same level as before open source happened. Thus, it cannot clearly show
how these two forces aect the market separately. I employ then reduced form analysis to
tackle this problem. The total market share of PHEVs of each period serves as a dependent
variable, while the unit investment costs and entry costs from last periods enter the equation
as covariances. I also control for all the other good reasons why market share would change.
Other than providing an intriguing study on the impact of open source on the development
of an industry, this paper also contributes to the string of literature that uses counterfactuals
based on a dynamic structural model to analyze policy-relevant events, such as Collard-Wexler
(2013); Sweeting (2013); Igami (2015) and Fowlie et al. (2016). Instead of solving equilibrium,
I use the estimated policy functions to perform the forward simulation. This approach is
only possible based on the assumption, that my counterfactual case happens in the market
environment that is exactly the same as the one before the open source event occurs.
Through my counterfactual analysis, I nd that Tesla introduces fewer cars in the market
and have a lower discounted return, if the industry would have evolved without open source.
Less entry is the strategic response to the higher entry costs. Tesla also invests slightly less,
but the investment expenditure in total is still higher compared to the one calculated based on
the data. The reason is the substantially lower unit investment cost induced by open source.
The lower discounted return without technology sharing explains why Tesla proposed open
source.
From the point of view of the whole industry, the number of distinct PHEVs in the market
drops by 33% due to high entry costs, while the average quality remains more or less the
same. That is because the lower-quality PHEVs are more sensitive to the high entry costs and
leads to the selection of entrants. The total discounted return (the sum of discounted returns
of all PHEVs) is lower in the simulated case, which is the combined result of the high entry
and investment costs. The overall prots from all PHEVs are also lower in the counterfactual
analysis, while the average across PHEVs is slightly higher. That suggests even though PHEVs
prot from the milder competition in the product market, the size of the market (in terms of
the number of distinct models) matters more.
The reduced-form analysis reveals how the decreases in unit investment costs and entry
costs after the introduction of open source explain the expansion of the market. I nd that
unit investment cost aects the market share more eciently compared to entry costs. They
account for 22% and 5.3% of the increase in the market share at the end of 2017, respectively.
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The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. I discuss the datasets that I use
in section 2.2 and present the model in section 2.3. The policy experiment is described in
detail in section 2.4. I discuss the results from the counterfactual analysis in section 2.5 and
highlight the contribution on the market share of PHEVs from dierent sources in section 2.6.
Conclusion is presented in section 2.7.
2.2 Data
My data come from a variety of sources. The whole data concerns the US car market from
the rst quarter of 2012 to the second quarter of 2017. The monthly sales (in quantity) of
conventional cars (i.e. gasoline and diesel cars) are from WardsAuto U.S. light vehicle sales,
which spans from January 2012 until August 2015. I collect the monthly sales of PHEVs from
hybridcars.com, which cover the periods from beginning of 2012 till the end of 2017. The sales
data are aggregated to the quarter level. Then, I supplement these sales data with car physical
characteristics and prices data from MSNAutos websites. Lastly, I obtain a consumer subjective
measure on performance and design for both conventional cars and PHEVs from JD-Power
and Consumer Reports. I discuss each in turn.
Table 2.1: 10 Car Manufacturers with Highest Total Sales (2012Q1 - 2017Q2)
Brand Conventional Cars Plug-in Hybrid & Electric
# Models Sales (in 1000) # Models Sales (in 1000)
1 Toyota 14 5,339 2 44
2 Ford 11 5,253 3 52
3 Chevrolet 14 4,812 2 77
4 Honda 9 4,422 2 2
5 Nissan 13 3,843 1 75
6 Hyundai 10 2,663 0 0
7 Jeep 7 2,212 0 0
8 Kia 8 2,032 1 0.9
9 Subaru 8 1,650 0 0
10 Dodge 8 1,576 0 0
The sales data that covers both conventional cars and PHEVs shows signicant reluctance
of consumers to purchase this new type of cars. While on average more than 3 million con-
ventional cars are sold in each quarter from the rst quarter of 2012 to the second quarter
of 2015, the sales of plug-in hybrid cars and electrics cars are only on average 11,440 and
12,100, respectively. Dierent car manufacturers also shows completely dierent strategies in
terms of the provision of PHEVs. Table 2.1 lists the ten car manufacturers with the highest
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total sales of cars. Out of these ten manufacturers, four do not provide any PHEV. Among
those manufacturers that market PHEVs, they only provide no more than three distinct PHEV
models. In contrast, they market on average more than ten conventional car models.
The sales data of PHEVs cover a longer period, i.e. from the rst quarter of 2012 to the
last quarter of 2017. These data shows a slow upward trend of adoption of PHEVs. Figure 2.1
depicts the quarterly sales of PHEVs over time. The blue round dots represent the combined
sales of PHV and EV, while the red square dots and the green triangle dots show the sales of
PHV and EV, respectively. Though the sales are increasing already from 2012 till 2015, we
see a faster rising after 2015, which could be driven by the open source initiative that was
proposed in the end of 2014 by Tesla.
Figure 2.1: Quarterly Sales of Plug-in Hybrid and Electric Vehicles
I web-scrapped the website MSNAutos to collect the physical attributes and manufacturer’s
suggested retail price of the cars that show up in my sales data. As the sales data do not distin-
guish among the possible several trims that belong to one car model, I use the characteristics
of the cheapest trim as the representative characteristics. For instance, I obtain dierent sales
data for Volkswagen Golf and Volkswagen Passat in the rst quarter of 2015, but I do not know
how much of the sales come from Golf 2.5L FWD and how much from Golf 2.0L TDI. Thus, I
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take the attributes of Golf 2.5L FWD for all Golf sold in 2015, which is the cheapest one among
all available Golf trims in that particular year.
The attributes that I include into my data are size, cargo volume, horsepower per weight,
fuel economy, range on highway, and two dummy variables. One describes whether the car
has navigation as a standard equipment, and the other one shows whether a car is categorized
as PHEV. Size is dened as length times width, and cargo volume determines the space for
luggage. Horsepower per weight serves as a proxy for how powerful the engine/motor is.
Fuel economy describes how ecient a car is in terms of using gasoline, diesel or electricity.
It is dened as miles per gallon (MPG) for conventional cars, as miles per gallon-equivalent
electricity (MPGe) for EVs, and as distance-weighted MPG/MPGe for PHVs, i.e. total range/
(range with gasoline/MPG + range with electricity/MPGe).1 Range on highway is the maximum
distance a car can achieve on highway, which usually provides the best driving condition. It
is calculated for conventional car when its tank is fully lled, and EV when its battery is fully
charged. For PHV, I use the combined maximum range by its gasoline/diesel engine and the
range by its electric motor.
These physical characteristics together with sales allow me to identify how consumer eval-
uate each attribute. However, it is common sense that consumers care not only horsepower
or fuel economy, but also the comfort or the design. That is the reason I include the con-
sumers evaluation of performance and design (PD) for each car model in each year. I use two
data sources for this subjective measure: APEAL (Automotive Performance, Execution and
Layout) survey from JD-Power, and the wner Satisfaction survey from Consumer Reports. In
both surveys, consumer are asked to evaluate whether the seats are comfortable, whether
the styling of the car is enjoyable, whether the entertainment system (navigation or audio) is
easily interactive, etc. This measure ranges from 1 to 5.
After combining characteristics, sales and the price, I obtain my two nal datasets. The rst
dataset spans from the rst quarter of 2012 to the second quarter of 2015 and contains both
conventional car and PHEVs. I use this dataset to perform the demand estimation and to obtain
the taste parameter of each car characteristics and the price sensitivities. The inclusion of the
conventional cars indicates that consumers are free to choose across dierent car categories,
which is realistic, and also increases the variation of the data such that I can identify the taste
parameters more precisely. I allow the taste parameters to be the same across conventional cars
and PHEV models, which is based on the assumption that consumers evaluate these attributes
in the similar way across dierent car categories.
1In some cases information on fuel economy and maximum driving range on highway were missing,. In
these cases I collected them manually from Fueleconomy.gov.
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My second nal dataset spans from the rst quarter of 2012 to the last quarter of 2017
and contains only PHEV models. This dataset capture the entry/exit decisions, improvement
in physical characteristics, and changes in consumers’ subjective measure and prices and
thus, documents nicely the industry dynamics. These changes in characteristics together with
the taste parameters that are estimated using the rst dataset allows me to form the quality
evolution of each PHEV models and to perform the analysis of the dynamic supply side.
Table 2.2: Evolution of PHEVs Characteristics (2012-2015)
Price HP/Weight MPG(e) Range (Highway) Sales Entry Exit
PHV EV
2012 #Model: 9
Mean 36.95 0.41 5.78 4.43 1.09 52.61 6 0
Std 5.55 0.10 2.52 0.79 0.75
2013 #Model: 16
Mean 38.43 0.48 7.39 4.68 1.01 98.79 7 0
Std 11.07 0.18 3.27 0.83 0.31
2014 #Model: 22
Mean 37.49 0.47 7.84 4.83 1.21 122.47 7 1
Std 15.69 0.17 3.47 0.83 0.54
2015 #Model: 26
Mean 43.01 0.53 8.22 4.69 1.37 115.98 5 1
Std 20.35 0.20 3.50 0.87 0.57
2016 #Model: 31
Mean 45.45 0.53 7.32 4.79 1.57 158.71 6 1
Std 19.55 0.14 3.42 0.82 0.58
2017 #Model: 40
Mean 43.01 0.53 7.57 5.05 1.77 181.53 10 1
Std 17.69 0.13 3.39 1.09 0.56
Price is in $1000, HP/Weight is horsepower per 10 lbs., MPG(e) is tens of miles per gallon,
Range (Highway) is in 100 miles, Sales is in 1000 units.
In Table 2.2 I show the evolution of the PHEV industry from beginning of 2012 to the
end of 2017. I present the sales-weighted average prices and characteristics in the rst to the
fth columns. Sales and number of car models that enter or exit the market are presented in
the column six to eight. I also report the number of PHEVs that are active in the market in
each year, which clearly states an expanding of the market, with the amount of active PHEV
increasing from only 9 models till 40 models. Overall, both prices and the characteristics
show an increasing trend. The increasing standard deviation of prices indicates that the
variety of available PHEVs becomes larger over time. The improvement of the characteristics,
especially with the striking increasing in the maximum range on highway for both PHVs and
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EVs, suggests the qualities of these kind of car also improved over time. Beside there are more
PHEVs in the market, the yearly sales also perform a strong increase. In 2017, the sales are
more than 3 time higher than the sales in 2012. Each year, I observe some new car models
enter the market, while no more than one model exits.
Figure 2.2: Quality Distribution
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To have a better illustration of how qualities dier prior to OS and after, I construct the
quality level of each PHEV using the taste parameter that obtained from Yan (2020) and the
characteristics. There are in total six quality levels, where level one represents the lowest
quality and six the highest one. Figure 2.2 shows the distribution of PHEVs prior to and after
the open-source initiative in the third quarter of 2014. The blue solid bar represents the qualities
before open source and the transparent bar with orange frame are the qualities afterwards. In
both periods, I observe that most PHEV models belong to the low-quality category, which is
level one to level three. But after open source, there is a a strong shift of the low-quality cars
towards high-quality levels. Only around 15% of PHEVs locate in the high-quality levels prior
to the open source event, while after this percentage increases to almost 30%.
2.3 Model
To analyse how the PHEV industry would have evolved in the absense of Tesla’s open source
initiative, I need to specify a dynamic model, which characterizes the behaviors of PHEVs in
terms of entry, exit, investment and competition in the product market. The model primitives,
timing, and information structure follow from the framework of Yan (2020). In this section, I
discuss in detail the model of demand and supply, on which I conduct the policy experiment.
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In each period, the events is unfolded in three dierent stages. In the rst stage, potential
PHEV entrants decide on whether to enter after observing the private random entry costs.
Once they decide to enter, it will take one period for the entrants to setup the production
line before engaging in the market competition. At the same time, one of the lowest-quality
PHEV incumbents may face an exogenous shock and exit the industry. In the second stage, the
remaining PHEV incumbents receive choice-specic shocks on investment and decide whether
to invest or not. The outcome of the investment is stochastic, which will only be realized at
the end of the period, and the quality of PHEVs evolves according. In the nal stage, PHEV
incumbents compete in the product market with conventional cars, where consumers make
purchase decisions and car manufacturers collect their prots.
I discuss each component in turn.
2.3.1 Demand
As the game can only be solved backward, I start by discussing the last stage of the game –
the demand side. I model the demand using a static discrete-choice specication (Berry, 1994),
where consumers can choose to purchase a car, whether PHEV or conventional ones, or an
outside option, which includes not buying a car or buying a car that is not included in my
dataset.2 As the demand is assumed to be static, I omit the time superscript in discussing the
demand model. The indirect utility for a consumer i from buying car j is given by:
uij =
H∑
h=1
αhzhj − α0pj + ηj + ij, (2.1)
where zhj denotes the h-th car characteristics such as size, horsepower per weight etc., pj
is the price and ηj represents the car characteristics that are observed by consumers but not
by the econometrician. The term ij is an idiosyncratic taste shock that follows a Type-I
Extreme Value distribution. These shocks are independently and identically distributed across
consumers and products. I assume each consumer purchases at most one car in each period,
which is a standard assumption in the literature (Berry et al., 1995; Petrin, 2002; Beresteanu
and Li, 2011). I further normalized the utility from the outside option ui0 to be zero. To identify
the taste parameters αh and price elasticity α0, I use the the rst dataset that spans from the
rst quarter of 2012 to the second quarter of 2015, which contains sales, prices and attributes
of both conventional cars and PHEVs.
2It would be more realistic to consider a dynamic demand specication. However, it would greatly increase
the computation complexity if it is not unfeasible. Moreover, the main focus and the contribution of this project
lie in providing a novel analysis on the entry, exit and investment behaviors of the car industry. Thus, I choose
to take a compromise on the demand side.
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Giving that consumers choose the cars that give them the highest utility and the distribution
assumption of the error term ij , the market share of car j is
sj =
exp(
∑H
h=1 αhzhj − α0pj + ηj)
1 +
∑
k∈J exp(
∑H
h=1 αhzhk − α0pk + ηk)
. (2.2)
Using a logit transformation, equation (2.2) can be written as ln(sj)− ln(si) =
∑H
h=1 αhzhj −
α0pj + ηj , which can be easily estimated given the information on prices and characteristics
of all cars and the assumption that ηj is orthogonal to the observed attributes.
After estimating the demand equations (2.2) and obtain the taste parameters αh, I can
construct the absolute quality of each car as
qj =
H∑
h=1
αhzhj + ηj, (2.3)
which follows the similar approach as (Fan, 2013). In this way, I reduce the cars’ heterogeneity
from several dimensions to only one and facilitate the further analysis of the dynamic supply
model. I then follow Goettler and Gordon (2011) and discretize the absolute quality qj into
quality levels, which is denoted by ωj . These quality levels are dined as the state variables of
each PHEV.
2.3.2 Price Competition
In each period, multi-product car manufacturers choose prices of their cars to maximize their
overall prots. The prot of a car manufacturer f is dened as
pif (p, q,ω) =
∑
j∈Jf
pij(p, q,ω) =
∑
j∈Jf
sj(p, q)M [pj − cj(ω)], (2.4)
which is the sum of the prot of car j that belongs to the product set Jf of manufacturer f .
Vector of prices of these cars are given by p, q is the vector of absolute qualities, ω denotes
the vector of quality levels (which is a mapping from q), sj(p, q) is given by equation (2.2), M
is the market size and cj(ω) denotes the marginal production cost. I dene the market as the
the households in the US, who did not purchase any cars in the previous year.
I assume that the marginal costs depends on the quality levels ωj for both conventional
cars and PHEVs in the same fashion, while for the PHEVs, in additional, enjoy the economy
of scales eect of the market expending. That is, the marginal cost of PHEVs should decrease
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with the amount of distinct PHEV models in the market. Thus, the marginal cost mcj of a car
model j can be written as
mcj(ω) =
γ0ωj + υj if j is conventional car,γ0ωj + γ1(∑Nj=1 1(PHEVj = 1)) + υj if j is PHEV. (2.5)
where γ1 measures the eect of economies of scales and υj represents the cost driver that is
only observed by manufacturers but not the econometrician.
A multi-product car manufacturer choose prices for all its produced cars to maximize the
static per-period prot. Therefore, the system of rst-order conditions as shown in equation
(2.6) has to be satised.
∂pif
∂pj
= M
sj + ∑
k∈Jf
(pk −mck(ω)) ∂sk(p, q,ω)
∂pj
 = 0 for all j ∈ Jf . (2.6)
Using equation system (2.6) and demand estimates, I can back out the the marginal costs
of all the cars in the market. I then estimate equation (2.5) to obtain the relationship between
the marginal costs and the quality levels.
2.3.3 Investment
PHEV has incentive to invest to improve its quality, as it positively aects the market share,
and thus, the prot as discussed in the previous two subsections. Whereas the multi-product
car manufacturers make the pricing decisions, I assume the investment decision is done by the
manager of each PHEV. That is, when the manager decides whether to improve the quality or
not, she does not internalize the investment decision of other managers, who serve the same
car manufacturers.3
The quality changes depends on the costly investments, which is assumed to be a discrete
choice xtj ∈ {0, 1} and it leads to stochastic results if investment takes place. After observing
private choice-specic shocks, φtj(xtj), PHEV incumbents make their investment decisions,
where the shocks are assumed to be independent and identically distributed according to the
Type I extreme value distribution. Taking into account of the per-period prots from the
product market, the investment decision and the choice-specic cost, the per-period payo of
PHEV j is given by
p˜itj(ω
t) + C(ωj)x
t
j + φ
t
j(x
t
j), (2.7)
3This assumption is made based on the discussion with the industry industry. It also facilitate the estimation
process.
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where p˜itj(ωt) denotes the maximized prot from the market competition and C(ωj) is the
state-dependent investment cost, which is specied as
C(ωj) = c¯ ω
2
i . (2.8)
The underlying assumption of this specication is that it becomes more expensive to make an
improvement when the original quality level is high, which is intuitive.
Once the manager of a PHEV model decide to invest, the car may have dierent levels of
improvement. I denote τ tj = {0, 1, 2} as the possible levels of improvement, i.e., after investing,
the quality level of this PHEV may stay the same (τ tj = 0), increase by one or two units (τ tj = 1
or 2). These outcomes take place with the following probabilities:
p(τ tj = 0|xtj = 1) = 1− p(τ tj = 1|xtj = 1)− p(τ tj = 2|xtj = 1),
p(τ tj = 1|xtj = 1) = p1 + λ11(OSj = 1), (2.9)
p(τ tj = 2|xtj = 1) = p2 + λ21(OSj = 1),
where OSj indicates that PHEV j belongs to the open-source rm Tesla, and λ1, λ2 are pa-
rameters to estimate that represent an innovation advantage of the open source rm. If the
manager of a PHEV decides not to invest, then the quality level of this PHEV drops by one
with probability one in the next period.
At the end of the period, the investment outcomes are realized. For each PHEV, its quality
level (state) evolves in the following fashion:
ωt+1j = ω
t
j + τ
t
j1(x
t
j = 1)− 1(xtj = 0), (2.10)
where ωtj and ωt+1j denotes the current quality level and the quality level in the next period,
respectively.
I assumed when a PHEV already reaches the highest possible quality level – level six, it can
no longer have a successful investment and when a PHEV is at the lowest quality level, it will
no longer suer a quality drop even if it does not invest. I make these assumptions to avoid
explosion of the state space.
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2.3.4 Potential Entrants
At the beginning of each period t, ve potential entrants arrive with randomly drawn quality
levels ω(e)tj from the distribution F eω(·).4 Each potential entrant faces a private random entry
cost φ(e)tj , which is independently and identically distributed across potential PHEV entrants
and periods according to a distribution F eφ(·). The potential entrant makes entry decision
based on its quality level, the current quality distribution of the incumbents and its private
entry cost, which can be denoted as
χtj(ω
(e)t
j ,ω
t, φ
(e)t
j ) ∈ {0, 1}, (2.11)
where χtj(ω
(e)t
j ,ω
t, φ
(e)t
j ) = 1 indicates that potential entrant j with quality level ω
(e)t
j decides
to enter the market with the current market structure ωt, after drawing the entry cost φ(e)tj .
When χtj(ω
(e)t
j ,ω
t, φ
(e)t
j ) = 0, it means that the potential entrant decide not to enter. However,
when entrant j enters the market, it will not participate in the product market competition at
time t neither can it invest in improving quality. The entrants have to use this whole period to
set up the production line with payment φ(e)tj and become an incumbent in the next period t+1.
Unlike the incumbents, potential entrants are short-lived. If they do not enter the industry,
they receive nothing and vanish. As potential PHEV entrant makes the entry decision based
on the private information on quality level and entry cost, the incumbent PHEV can only
form expectation of the probability that one new PHEV enters the industry. The probability
is denoted by
ξ
(e)t
j (ω
t) ≡ prob(χtj(ω(e)tj ,ωt, φ(e)tj ) = 1) =
∫ ∫
χtj(ω
t, φ
(e)t
j )dF
e
φ(φ
e
j)dF
e
ω(ω
e
j ) (2.12)
as the probability that a potential PHEV entrant j enters the market with the industry state
ωt.
2.3.5 Exit
Simultaneously to entry, at the beginning of each period, exit may also occur. However, I
assume that the exit is an exogenous event and only one incumbent with the lowest quality
level may leave the industry. Such assumptions are motivated by data, where exit is rarely
observed. Exit happens with probability ψ and the lowest-quality PHEV incumbents face the
4The assumption on the amount of potential entrants is motivated by data. I observe on average two entrants
per period, with the maximum being four. The pool of quality levels of the potential entrants is given by the
empirical distribution of the observed entrants in the data.
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same probability of exiting. For instance, if there are three incumbents in quality level one,
which is the lowest possible state, then each of them has a probability of ψ/3 to exit.
2.3.6 Equilibrium
In each period t, PHEVs makes entry and investment decisions to maximize its discounted
future returns, taking into account that the pricing decisions is made by multi-product car
manufacturers in a myopic fashion. That yields the value function of incumbent PHEV j,
when facing the investment decision:
V tj (ω
t, φtj) = max
xtj∈{0,1}
{
p˜itj(ω
t) + C(ωj)x
t
j + φ
t
j(x
t
j) (2.13)
+ βE{V t+1j (ωt+1, φt+1j )|ωt, ωt+1j 6= 0, xtj(ωt), xt−j(ωt), ξ(e)t−j (ωt)}
}
where the rst line represents the per-period return as discussed in equation (2.7) and the
second line denotes the expectation of the discounted future value function. This expectation
is taken with respect to j’s investment outcome (τ tj ), j’s rivals’ investment decisions (xt−j(ωt)),
potential entrants’ decisions (ξ(e)t−j (ωt)) and that j remain in the industry (ωt+1j 6= 0). The
discount rate β takes the value of 0.925.
Potential PHEV entrant only enters, when the expected discounted future return exceeds
the randomly drawn entry cost. The value function of a potential entrant j is given by
V
(e)t
j (ω
t, φ
(e)t
j ) = max
χ
(e)t
j ∈{0,1}
{
χ
(e)t
j (2.14)(
− φ(e)tj + βE{V t+1j (ωt+1, φt+1j )|ωt, ωt+1j 6= 0, xt−j(ωt, ξ(e)t−j (ωt))}
)}
where the expectation term is essentially the same as the incumbent if the entry occurs (ωt+1j 6=
0). The dierences lie in the fact that the entrant makes no investment and cannot compete
in the product market. Instead, it pays the randomly drawn entry costs (φ(e)tj ), where χ
(e)t
j
denotes the entry choice.
I assume PHEVs use symmetric strategies that depend solely on the current industry state,
their own state, the unit investment cost and their randomly drawn entry costs/investment-
choice-specic shocks, leading to a Markov-Perfect Nash Equilibrium (Ericson and Pakes, 1995;
Maskin and Tirole, 1988). For ease of exposition, I omit all time subscripts, as time does not
play a role in the optimal strategy.
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Let σj be the strategy used by PHEV j, which denotes the incumbents’ investment decisions
and potential entrants’ entry decisions. MPNE requires that each PHEV’s strategy is optimal
given the strategies of its competitors. That yields the following inequality:
Vj(ω, φj;σj, σ−j) ≥ Vj(ω, φj;σ′, σ−j), (2.15)
for all PHEV j, all states ω, all shocks φ and all possible alternative strategies σ′. The exis-
tence of a pure-strategy equilibrium is guarantee by these private shocks (Doraszelski and
Satterthwaite, 2010).
2.4 Policy Experiment and Simulation Procedure
The estimates of the above-described model are presented and discussed in Yan (2020). It shows
a sharp decrease in unit investment cost and a slight fall in entry cost after Tesla proposed its
open source initiative. However, Tesla does not enjoy a direct benet from the open source,
as its innovation advantage due to the familiarity with its own shared technology is estimated
to be insignicant from zero. The estimation results also conrm the existence of the eect of
economies of scale in the PHEV industry.
Several questions remain unanswered in Yan (2020): what is the incentive of Tesla being
open source, when there seems to be no direct benet? How would the industry develop if
there is no open source? How to compare the benet from the lower investment cost and from
the decreased entry cost?
One main appeal of the structural model is that I can experiment with the dierent scenarios
using simulation analysis. To understand why Tesla chose to open source and how the PHEV
industry would have evolved without the open source initiative, I conduct a simulation of
the industry dynamics, shutting down the benet that open source brings. After the third
quarter of 2014, at which point the open source initiative in reality occurs, I force the players
in the market to face the higher entry costs and unit investment cost as estimated prior to
the open source event. As discussed in the model section, players choose optimal strategies
based on the industry structure, own quality, investment cost or entry cost, and the randomly
drawn private cost shock. This assumption allows me to use the estimated policy functions
based on the observed behaviors of all PHEVs before open source occurs. I then use these
policy functions to predict how the players respond in terms of investment choice and entry
decisions, and the evolution of the industry in the simulated case.5
5The simulation case is a simple forward play of what I observe in reality in the PHEV industry before open
source. That means the players form the expectation and make decisions in the same way as I estimated prior to
open source. That gives me the opportunity to circumvent solving a computational demanding equilibrium in
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At the beginning of my simulation, which is the third quarter of 2014, I observe eighteen
PHEVs being active in the market. These 18 PHEVs are mainly concentrated in the low-quality
levels: 5 PHEVs belong to quality level one, 4 to level two, 6 to level three, and only 2 and 1
to quality levels ve and six, respectively. They made up the total sales of 34,335 units in that
quarter, which only account for 1% of the whole car market.
The simulation unfolds the events as described in section 2.3. Five potential entrants
arrive at the beginning of the period, with both quality levels and brands randomly drawn.
Based on the current industry structure, i.e., the quality distribution of incumbents, and their
own quality levels, the policy function of entry predicts whether some potential entrants will
enter. Simultaneously, I randomly draw an exit shock, which will determine whether one
of the incumbents with the lowest-quality will leave the market. Then, random draws on
investment cost shocks and the investment policy function determine each remaining PHEV
incumbent, whether it will invest or not. The incumbents, excluding the new entrants and
the one that exits the market, compete in the product market together with the conventional
counterpartners. I back out the marginal production cost of each car based on equation (2.5),
given their quality levels and brands, and calculate the market share of PHEVs and conventional
cars using the estimated taste parameters and price sensitivity. Then, I am able to compute the
product market prots of all PHEV players. Together with the unit investment cost and their
investment decisions, I obtain the per-period payo as discussed by equation (2.7). At the end
of the period, I draw the realization of the investment outcomes according to the estimation
of the equation (2.9) and each PHEV evolves as (2.10) describes. The industry structure for the
next period is then determined by the evolution of the incumbents, the entry decisons of the
entrants and the exit event.
I forward simulate the PHEV industry development until the last quarter of 2017, which is
the last period that my data captures. I repeat this whole process for 500 times to compute the
average simulated industry structure. Using the simulated per-period payos and the discount
factor, I can conduct the discounted value for all PHEVs and conventional cars from the third
quarter of 2014 to the last quarter of 2017.
the simulation. However, to evaluate other policies in such a setting, one need to solve for the equilibrium. I will
leave this to future research.
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2.5 Results
2.5.1 Tesla’s Profit
To understand why Tesla use open source, I compute the simulated discounted return of Tesla
in the scenario as described in section 2.4,
V 2014Q3−2017Q4Tesla =
2017Q4∑
t=2014Q3
∑
j∈Tesla
βt
(
1(j ∈ incumbent)(p˜itj(ωˆt) + C(ωˆj)xˆtj + φtj(xˆtj)) (2.16)
+ 1(j ∈ entrant)χˆ(e)tj (−φ(e)tj ),
)
which is the sum of the discounted return of all PHEVs that belongs to Tesla, that could be
both incumbents or entrants. The terms ωˆ and ωˆj are the simulated industry structure and
the simulated quality structure of Tesla’s car, C(·) represent the estimated investment cost
function prior to the open source event, xˆtj and χˆ
(e)t
j indicate the simulated investment and
entry choices, φtj and φ
(e)t
j are the individual private cost shocks regarding investment behavior
or entry decision.
I make the same analysis for Tesla using the real data, i.e., I replace the simulated industry
structure and simulated decisions by the observed structure and behaviors in the equation
(2.16). The data from the third quarter of 2014 to the last quarter of 2017 shows that Tesla
has in total three car models being active in this period, with the names "Model S", "Model
X" and "Model 3". Model S is already in the market in the interested periods, while Model X
enters in the third quarter of 2015 and Model 3 in the third quarter of 2017. The quality level
of Model S and Model X are both on average above ve, while Model 3 is on level one. They
make investments in 90% of the time compared to the probability of 83% from the rest of the
industry.
Table 2.3 shows the result of the above-described analysis. The rst column documents
the calculation based on the data, and column two shows the results from the counterfactual
analysis. As those discounted values are conducted from 500 simulations, I also report the
standard deviation in the parenthesis. The rst row suggests that Tesla has a negative sum of
discounted pre-period return (-$3.51 billion), if the industry would have evolved without open
source and PHEVs face higher investment and entry costs. Whereas Tesla still has negative
but a bit higher discounted return of -$ 2.19 billion for the same time period if open source
occurs.
I then separate the total discounted returns into the sum of the discounted investment ex-
penditure, the sum of the discounted per-period market prot, and the sum of discounted entry
expenditure to explore on which part open source has the most signicant eect. The results
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are reported in the second to fourth rows in Table 2.3. It shows that investment expenditure
accounts for most of the discounted return. Due to the higher unit investment cost without
the open source initiative, the simulated case’s investment expenditure is substantially higher
than in the case that I observed in the data. However, the prot and entry cost is lower in the
counterfactual scenario, which seems counterintuitive. This is due to the fact that Tesla has
less incentive to introduce new cars in the market, when facing the high entry costs in the
simulated case. Whereas I observe two Tesla cars enter the market during the third quarter of
2014 to the end of 2017 in the data, on average only in 40% of the simulations Tesla introduces
one new car and 17% of the times more than one new model. With fewer cars in the market,
Tesla collects naturally less prot.
Table 2.3: Tesla: Comparison of Data with Simulation (2014Q3-2017Q4)
With OS Without OS Without OS
(Data) (1.Simulation) (2.Simulation)
Discounted Return (10M$ ) -218.9 -350.8 -432.1
(111.5) (110.7)
Investment Expenditure (10M$) -215.5 -326.1 -401.2
(119.8) (118.7)
Prot(10M$) 47.5 23.7 35.9
(9.8) (9.4)
Entry Cost(10M$) -50.9 -21.5 -70.4
(13.3) (31.0)
Standard errors in parentheses
To better understand the trade-o of the entry costs and the competition levels in the
product market, I run another set of simulations. On top of the setting described in section 2.4,
I also force Tesla to introduce two new cars into the market. The timing of the introduction
and the quality levels of these two cars is assumed to be the same as in the data. The last
column in Table 2.3 shows the results of this simulation. In this case, the discounted return
of Tesla is even lower than the rst simulation. That is intuitive, as I deliberately let Tesla
to deviate from the optimal entry strategy in this analysis. The investment expenditure and
entry costs are both higher in this scenario, as Tesla has more cars in this counterfactual case.
The prot is higher than in the rst simulation, as there are more Tesla cars in the product
market, but still lower than the one from the data, which is a result of low incentive to invest.
Due to the high unit investment cost, Tesla is less likely to invest in the simulated case and
ends up with lower quality levels. The average investment probability across all Tesla cars is
0.87 in the simulation, with an average quality level of 3.68, while these numbers are 0.90 and
5.30 in the data.
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2.5.2 Industry Structure
Using the same simulation process as described in section 2.4, I explore how the whole PHEV
industry structure evolves in this subsection. To visualize the eect of open source on the
expansion of the PHEV industry, I report the quality distribution of PHEVs in the market in
the last quarter of 2017 in Figure 2.3.
Figure 2.3: Quality Level Distribution of PHEVs in 2017 Q4
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The dark blue bar represents the quality distribution of PHEVs without Tesla opening its
technology. The light yellow bar shows the quality distribution that I observed from the data.
I observe on average 24.6 active PHEVs at the end of 2017 in my simulation, with a standard
deviation of 4.45, which is signicantly lower than the real amount (37) of PHEVs that I observe
from the data. As shown in the graph, more PHEVs are active with the help of open source in
all quality levels, except level ve. In general, open source allows more low-quality PHEVs to
enter the market. It could be explained by the fact, that PHEVs with lower quality are more
sensitive about the decrease in entry cost, because their expected future returns are lower than
those entering with higher quality.
Figure 2.4 shows the industry dynamics from the third quarter of 2014 until the last quarter
of 2017. The horizontal axis represents the time while the vertical axis displays the number of
distinct PHEV models in each quarter. The blue solid line shows the industry structure based
on data, and the red dashed line represents the structure in the simulated scenario. The red
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dotted line shows the 95% condence interval of the simulated number of PHEVs. In both
cases, I observe a clear expansion of the market, while in the real data, the expansion speed
is signicantly faster than in the simulated case, which is due to the high entry costs in the
simulation.
Figure 2.4: Number of PHEVs in Data and in Counterfactual 2014Q3 – 2017Q4
I show the quality dynamics in Figure 2.5, where I report the average quality level in
each quarter. The blue solid line captures the overall quality changes in the data after open
source occurs, where we see a clear trend of improvement. The red dashed line represents the
average quality levels in the simulated case, where I force the industry to evolve as if there
is no open source. The red dotted lines are the 95% condence interval. I also see a slight
improvement trend in the counterfactual scenario. Surprisingly, the average simulated quality
is almost always higher than the one documented by the data. The explanation is that there
are relatively few entrants in the simulated case, especially those in the low-quality levels (as
shown in Figure 2.3). Thus, not only is the quality dispersion higher in the data, but more
low-quality cars also enter and drag down the overall quality levels.
I then compute the total amount of discounted return for all PHEV, their investment expen-
ditures, prots from the product market and entry expenditure. The comparison between the
data and the simulation is shown in the rst panel of Table 2.4. The discounted return in the
simulated case is lower than in the data, as the investment expenditure is substantially higher.
The total prot is higher in the data. However, recall there are only on average 25 distinct
car models in the simulation, opposed to 37 models in the reality. That suggests the average
discounted prot is actually higher in the simulation, as a result of the milder competition in
the product market.
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Figure 2.5: Quality of PHEVs 2014Q3 – 2017Q4
I further break down the cars into two categories: incumbents and entrants. I dene a PHEV
model as incumbent if it is already in the market in the third quarter of 2014. All cars that enter
the market later than that time point are dened as entrants. The incumbents’ investment
expenditure in the period of 2014Q3 to 2017Q4 is lower in the simulated case than in the data,
while the prots are quite similar. As the incumbent PHEVs are less likely to invest in the
simulated scenario, their average quality levels are also slightly lower than what I observe in
reality. Thus, they lose some prots in the product market. However, the incumbents are at
the same time better o, as they face fewer competitors due to the fact that fewer potential
entrants nd it protable to enter the market. These two opposite eects result in comparable
prots in the end.
On average, 6 new PHEVs enter the market in the simulated case, whereas I observe 19
new models in the data. This explains why all the entrants’ values are smaller in the absolute
term in the simulation than in the data, as they are the sum of all the entrants. It is worth
noting that the average quality levels are higher in the simulation, suggesting that high entry
costs deter low-quality cars. That, together with the milder competition in the product market,
explains the entrant’s disproportional high prots in the counterfactual case, even though the
amount of the entrant PHEV is only one-third of what is observed in the data.
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Table 2.4: All PHEVs: Comparison of Data with Simulation (2014Q3-2017Q4)
Data Simulation
Discounted Return (B$ ) -12.83 -13.24
(3.56)
Investment Expenditure (B$) -10.25 -14.32
-2.23
Prot(B$) 3.36 2.66
(2.17)
Entry Cost(B$) -5.94 -1.58
(1.70)
Incumbent Entrant Incumbent Entrant
No. Model 18 19 18 6.32
Discounted Return (B$ ) -3.23 -9.9 -9.48 -3.76
(3.75) (1.41)
Investment Expenditure (B$ ) -5.58 -4.67 -11.6 -2.72
(4.04) (1.21)
Prot (B$ ) 2.35 0.71 2.12 0.54
(1.32) (0.29)
Entry Cost(B$) 0 -5.94 0 -1.58
- (1.70)
Prob. of Investment 0.85 0.81 0.82 0.80
(0.04) (0.11)
quality levels 2.56 3.08 2.47 3.43
(0.22) (0.62)
Standard errors in parentheses
Other than the statistics I present in Table 2.4, I also compute the total market share of
PHEVs for the interested period in the simulated scenario. Recall that the market is dened as
the US households that do not make any purchase of cars in the previous year. In the data, the
total market share of PHEVs is 0.0019 in the last quarter of 2017, while in the counterfactual
analysis, this number is 0.0009. That shows the negative eect on the market share from the
high entry cost outweighs the positive eect from the milder competition.
2.6 Contribution on Market Share
As discussed in the last section, open source leads to a higher market share of PHEVs, and it
can be driven by dierent sources, as described in section 2.3. Lower entry costs attract more
entrants, providing the consumers with a broader choice set and potentially leading to higher
PHEV market share. The low investment gives the incumbents a higher incentive to invest
and to improve the car’s quality, which could attract the consumers away from conventional
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cars and induce a higher market share of PHEV. To separate these two strings of eects, I run
the following regression:
MSt = α1qjt + α2ICt−1 + α3ECt−1 + δJf + δt (2.17)
where MSt is the market share of all PHEVs in the market at time t, i.e., MSt =
∑
j sjt, qjt is
the quality level of PHEV j at time t, ICt−1 and ECt−1 denote the unit investment cost and
entry cost from the last period t− 1, δJf captures the xed eect induced by the manufacturer
f that produces car j, and δt is the year xed eect.
The unit investment cost is the same for all observations in a given period. That means, the
unit investment cost is constantly 16.68 million dollars before open source, while it decreases
to 6.61 million dollars afterward. This variable serves as a proxy of how likely the incumbents
are going to invest in the previous period and determines the overall competitiveness of PHEVs
with respect to other means of transportation.
The entry costs are drawn from the estimated cost distribution. To be consistent with the
assumption in the model, that ve potential entrants arrive in each period, I randomly draw
for each period ve entry costs. Prior to open source initiative took place, I draw from the
uniform distribution [$555, $595] million and from [$460, $520] million afterward. Then, I
assign these ve entry costs randomly to the observation in the next period. This variable
captures how likely the potential entrants will enter the market, which partially determines
the market structure of PHEV in the current period in terms of how many distinct PHEV
models are available in the market for the consumers.
I present the estimation results in Table 2.5, where I show in total seven specications. The
dependent variables are quarterly market shares of all PHEVs in 0.0001 from the rst quarter of
2012 until the last quarter of 2017. The regressors are the quality levels of each PHEVs in each
quarter, unit investment costs, randomly drawn entry costs, and a constant. In specication
ve and six, I also include manufacturer xed eect and year xed eect separately. I then
include both xed eects in the last specication. The xed eect of the manufacturer controls
for the possible increase in market share induced by brand loyalty. Time xed eect is used to
rule out the unobserved market environment changes, e.g., consumers become more familiar
with these new types of cars and more willing to adopt it even though there is no substantial
improvement in the quality.
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Table 2.5: PHEV Market Share: Quality, Investment and Entry Cost
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Quarterly Market Share of PHEV (in 0.0001)
Quality 0.231∗∗ 0.116 0.157∗ 0.141 0.122 0.0677 0.162
(0.117) (0.0968) (0.0924) (0.0923) (0.164) (0.0663) (0.120)
Unit Investment Cost (M$) -0.445∗∗∗ -0.126∗∗ -0.0798 -0.386∗∗∗ -0.373∗∗∗
(0.0305) (0.0550) (0.0573) (0.0598) (0.0629)
Entry Cost (100M$) -5.174∗∗∗ -4.027∗∗∗ -3.957∗∗∗ -1.120∗∗ -1.178∗∗
(0.313) (0.590) (0.602) (0.454) (0.470)
Constant 12.55∗∗∗ 17.10∗∗∗ 39.60∗∗∗ 34.89∗∗∗ 35.40∗∗∗ 18.87∗∗∗ 18.92∗∗∗
(0.365) (0.433) (1.662) (2.639) (2.869) (2.186) (2.412)
Brand FE No No No No Yes No Yes
Year FE No No No No No Yes Yes
Observations 451 451 451 451 451 451 451
Adjusted R2 0.006 0.325 0.381 0.387 0.390 0.686 0.675
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Quality shows a signicantly positive eect on the overall market share of PHEV in the rst
specication, which can be interpreted as an increase of the average quality leads to a higher
market share of the PHEV industry as a whole. However, this eect shrinks both by size and
signicance when I include entry cost from the last period, and then completely fades away
as soon as I include unit investment cost. This suggests that the average quality improvement
are driven by the decrease in the investment cost and entry cost.
The coecients of unit investment cost and entry cost are both negative and signicant,
even after controlling for both manufacturer xed eect and year xed eect. While one
million dollars decrease in unit investment cost leads to a 0.000037 increase in the overall
market share of PHEV, a hundred million decrease in entry cost causes an increase of the
market share of approximately 0.00012.
Use the most complete specication – the seventh specication, I can conduct a back-of-the-
envelope calculation to compare the eectiveness of the decrease in investment cost and the
reduction in entry cost in terms of helping the PHEV industry to expand. After Tesla proposed
its open source initiative, the unit investment cost drops by 10.17 million dollars, which leads
to a 0.037 percentage point increase of the market share. Entry cost falls by on average 80
million dollars, which means that the market share will increase by 0.009 percentage points
according to my estimates.
Recall that the denition of the market share is the total number of PHEV being sold in one
quarter over the number of households in the US, who does not make any purchase of cars in
the previous year. Based on this denition, the market share of PHEV is merely 0.02% at the
beginning of 2014 and reaches 0.19% in the end of 2017. Even though the magnitudes of the
54
unit investment cost and entry cost seem small, they actually account for 22% (i.e., 0.037% /
0.17%) and 5.3% (i.e., 0.009% / 0.17%) of the market share changes in 2017 compared to the one
in 2014, respectively.
2.7 Conclusion
In this paper, I use the framework and estimation proposed and employed in Yan (2020) to
conduct a counterfactual analysis, where Tesla does not share the technology with its competi-
tors. More precisely, I forward simulate the PHEVs strategic behavior of entry and investment
under the assumption that the entry cost distribution and unit investment cost are as high
as before open source took place. In addition, I perform a reduced-form analysis using the
estimates from Yan (2020) to distinguish the eect of these two costs on the market expansion.
Counterfactual experiments suggest substantial underdevelopment of the PHEV industry
without open source. In the simulated scenario, where the open source of Tesla is not imple-
mented, the number of PHEVs decreases from 37 to around 25, by 33%. Moreover, according
to the behaviors simulated in the counterfactual case, Tesla’s discount return turns out to be
-3.5 billion dollars, which is more than one billion less then what I calculated based on the
data. That implies the eect of a lower investment cost due to open source on Tesla’s payo
exceeds the negative impact of ercer market competition.
The regressions imply that investment costs have a more substantial eect than the entry
cost on the overall market share of PHEVs. While one million dollars decrease in unit invest-
ment cost leads to a 3.7× 10−5 increase in the market share, a million decrease in entry cost
causes an increase in the market share of approximately 1.2× 10−6.
From a policy perspective, it is reasonable to encourage the leading rms in a newly emerg-
ing industry to engage in sharing their advanced technology. It will not only lead to an
expansion of the interested sector, but the open source rm may also have monetary returns
from such behavior. If open source is not a feasible alternative, it is recommended to provide
subsidy on innovation, as both analysis suggests that a reduction in the investment costs is
essential for a better development of the industry.
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3 The Pre-emptive Eects of
Advertising: Dynamics in the CPU
Industry
joint with Michelle Sovinsky
3.1 Introduction
Generally, preemptive behaviors refer to various measures that an incumbent rm takes to
defer rivals from entering the market or inhibiting the rivals from competing. Among others,
predatory pricing is the most prevalent. It is a price reduction that is protable only because
of its preemptive eect. However, other non-price predations are also not rare. Preemptive
investments, such as excessive capacity, product dierentiation or advertising, have a similar
objective as predatory pricing that would weaken or eliminate competitors. In this paper, we
focus on excessive advertising as a preemptive tool.
It is challenging to test whether advertisements are used in an anticompetitive fashion.
Advertising, as part of the marketing program, helps to build brand reputation and loyalty.
Thus, it is generally believed to build goodwill, and this may be a reason to invest in marketing
in the absence of anticompetitive motives.
To tackle this problem empirically, we look at a compelling case from the microprocessor
industry. As a dominant manufacturer, Intel launched a marketing campaign where it promised
a percentage rebate for downstream PC producers that market Intel-based computers. We use
market-level data on PC sales and characteristics, CPU sales and characteristics, PC and CPU
advertising expenditures, and CPU prices to examine whether Intel used advertising in a
dierent way for rms that were in an illegal relationship with them via exclusive deals, after
controlling for all the other good reasons one could advertise. Especially, we incorporate the
dynamic nature of advertising, i.e., the advertisement today will have an impact on consumers’
purchase decisions tomorrow. Without taking into account the long-run eect of advertising,
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we may underestimate the protability of using marketing/advertising campaigns and leads
to a dierent conclusion in terms of whether that is anticompetitive behavior.
While there is a vast theoretical literature on preemptive behaviors, there are relatively few
empirical studies, and these focus mainly on pricing predation. Related papers in the preemp-
tion literature include: Weiman and Levin (1994) examine predatory pricing by Southern Bell
Telephone Company when independent phone companies were trying to enter the market
during the period 1894 to 1912. Granitz and Klein (1996) provide evidence that Standard Oil
engaged in preemptive behavior by threatening to withhold inputs from railroads that were
not in the railroad cartel. Genesove and Mullin (2006) nd the price-cost margin was negative
in the sugar industry during price wars. Such preemptive behavior was used as a tool to es-
tablish a reputation as a tough competitor and, thus, protable. Morton (2000) test whether
pharmaceutical manufacturers use advertising to deter generic entry prior to patent expiration,
and Ellison and Ellison (2011) examine how investment serves as an entry deterrence behavior
in the same circumstance and focus on the asymmetry in detailing activities in markets of
dierent size. Similarly, Chen and Tan (2007) focus on whether detailing in the pharmaceu-
tical industry is consistent with preemptive incentives. Finally, Snider (2009) and Besanko
et al. (2014) estimate dynamic models of predatory pricing. While the rst one assesses the
impact of predation policies in the airline industry, the latter disentangle aggressive pricing
from pursuing eciency when there is learning-by-doing. Igami (2017) studies the preemptive
behavior of hard disk drive manufacturers between 1981 and 1998, with a focus on investment
and quality improvement. He nds that the cannibalization eect outweighs the preemptive
eect on incumbents.
Our work contributes to the stream of research that examines the dynamic eects of adver-
tising. These include papers by Salgado (2008b). Finally, we estimate the impact of advertising
in the CPU and PC market, which is related to work by Eizenberg et al. (2017),Sovinsky Goeree
(2008) and Salgado (2008a).
We nd that CPU rms benet from the advertisement expenditure in terms of quarterly
revenue, with Intel having substantially higher return than AMD. We also conrm that adver-
tising has a long run impact. As the estimation shows, even advertising from three quarters
earlier have a signicant and positive eect on CPU rms’ revenue. By comparing return
patterns from dierent types of rms and in dierent periods, the estimation results sup-
port our hypothesis that Intel use advertising in a dierent way for rms that engage in an
exclusive-dealing relation with Intel.
This paper is structured as follows. We introduce the Intel Inside campaign in section 3.2
and discuss the data we use in section 3.3. In Section 3.4, we present the estimation strategy.
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The results are discussed in section 3.5 and robustness checks are provided in section 3.6. We
nally draw conclusion in section 3.7.
3.2 Background
Intel has been investigated for predatory (pricing), exclusionary behavior, and the abuse of
a dominant position in the market for central processing units (CPU). According to U.S.
lawsuits, Intel used marketing loyalty rebates, payments, and threats to persuade computer
manufacturers, including Dell and Hewlett-Packard (HP), to limit their use of AMD (Intel’s
main rival) processors. In their investigations, U.S. antitrust authorities focused on whether
the loyalty rebates used by Intel were a predatory device in violation of the Sherman Act. The
European Commission (EC) brought similar charges and imposed a 1.06 billion Euro ne on
Intel for abuse of a dominant position. South Korean and Japanese antitrust authorities also
imposed nes on Intel for breach of antitrust regulations.
In the case of Intel, an important component to the case involved their marketing cam-
paign, “Intel Inside”, which provided marketing support for rms that sold Intel CPU chips.
Specically, it is a cooperative advertising program in which Intel contributes a percentage of
the purchase price of processors to a pool for PC rms to use to market Intel-based comput-
ers. According to the rules of the program PC rms can receive a rebate of their marketing
expenditures if they include the Intel logo in their advertising. By the end of the 1990s, Intel
had spent more than $7 billion on the marketing campaign (Moon and Darwall, 2002).
Intel was accused of using the marketing program to attempt to prevent computer makers
from oering machines with non-Intel computer chips. It became clear through correspon-
dence that Intel was trying to circumvent antitrust laws by using non-price predatory avenues.
For example, a 2002 Dell document states that the “original basis for the [Intel marketing] fund
is ... Dell’s loyalty to Intel”. The document explains that this means “no AMD processors”.1
The beginning of the alleged anticompetitive use of the Intel Inside program coincides with the
introduction by their main rival AMD’s Athlon chip (in 1999). Antitrust documentation shows
that Intel issued “conditional rebates” from December 2002 to December 2005, whereby they
would give rebates to some PC rms (Dell in particular) under the condition that the PC rm
buy exclusively from Intel.2 Otherwise, Intel would retract the marketing rebate and instead
use the market development money to fund competitors. An internal Dell presentation (in
2003) noted that if Dell switched to AMD, Intel’s retaliation “could be severe and prolonged
1US District Court for the District of Delaware Complaint. 2009
2U.S. District of Court for District of Columbia; SEC (Securities and Exchange Commission) vs. Dell, pp.
10-11 and U.S. District of Court for District of Delaware; State of New York, by Attorney General Andrew M.
Cuomo vs. Intel Corporation, p.6.
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with impact to all LOBs [Lines of Business]”. Intel allegedly treated HP, Lenovo, and Acer
similarly. For example, Intel rebates were conditional on HP buying 95% of its microproces-
sors for business desktops from Intel. In 2002, an HP executive wrote “PLEASE DO NOT . . .
communicate to the regions, your team members or AMD that we are constrained to 5% AMD
by pursuing the Intel agreement”.
Intel’s major (and only eective) rival is AMD, holding about 18 percent market share
(Mercury Research, 2007). In 1999 and 2003, respectively, AMD introduced two new chips,
the Athlon for personal computers and the Opteron for servers. These AMD chips were the
high-end products intended to compete with Intel. By introducing these 64-bit processors,
AMD enabled PC operating systems to handle large amounts of information more fastly and
accurately (as compared to a 32-bit OS system). These attributes were welcomed by experts
and consumers and it was generally agreed that these AMD chips were better-performing and
cheaper than Intel counterparts. The case les denote that the Athlon “was almost universally
recognized as being superior to Intel’s then current top model for PCs, the Pentium III” (pp.14-15,
Complaint, US District Court of Columbia, SEC vs. Dell) and that “Opteron garnered virtually
unanimous industry acclaim; AMD had succeeded with an innovative product design yielding
performance advantages which eectively “leapfrogged” Intel ” (pp.14-15, Complaint, US Dis-
trict Court of Delaware, State of New York vs. Intel). The threat of new, high-performance
processors from AMD may have induced Intel to engage in anticompetitive actions. These
events provide the motive for Intel’s predatory behavior. Indeed, many jurisdictions in the
world accused Intel of using various anticompetitive tactics against AMD starting in 2002.
To remain as a valid competitor in a rapidly changing, high-technology industry like the
CPU industry, rms need to secure constant cash ows and keep investing in innovation. The
CPU industry is capital-intensive, hence rms will incur substantial costs to construct and
maintain fabrication units (called “fabs”). If a rm does not have sucient internal funding,
it must obtain external funding at market rates. According to industry experts, Intel is able to
fund its fabs with revenue, while AMD must secure funding at market rates, which signicantly
raises AMD’s cost of capital. Furthermore, obtaining external nancing is complicated due
to agency problems. Typically investors require rms to show a positive prospect of future
prots, which is often based on current performance. Preemption would make the future
prospect of the prey look lower (and potentially negative) and ultimately induce it to exit
the market. Thus, preemption in the CPU market would be consistent with the long-purse
(deep-pocket) theory of predation.
Second, since rms are continuously innovating, they may be uncertain about how con-
sumers will react to new products. New processors can have dierent characteristics possibly
appealing to a dierent market segment from current customers. As mentioned before, the
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beginning of the anticompetitive use of the marketing program coincides with AMD’s intro-
duction of high-performance chips. By engaging in preemptive behavior, Intel could send a
(wrong) signal about the demand for new chips, which is consistent with the demand signaling
theory (test-market theory) of predation.
Lastly, economies of scale exist in the CPU industry. The substantial investment in plants
and technologies are sunk. Therefore, a rm needs to secure a certain amount of sales in order
to recover the sunk costs and stay in business. It is easier for a dominant rm to exclude a rival
and prevent new entrants in the presence of economies of scale. In this sense, preemption is
likely to be successful in driving AMD out of a market and Intel is likely to keep high prot
margins for a suciently long time.
The CPU industry is inviting to preemptive behavior for these reasons, and Intel is an
incumbent with a dominant market share. Given that Intel’s recoupment is very likely as a
monopolist due to high entry barriers and that preemption can successfully lead to exclude
AMD in the CPU industry, showing sacrice of short term prots would support that the
marketing program is predatory.
Price and quantity are not the only strategic variables that can be used for anticompetitive
purposes. Advertising is another important strategic variable commonly employed by rms.
However, antitrust authorities typically try to establish anticompetitiveness through pricing,
but do not address the strategic use of advertising and, more generally, marketing campaigns.
While the heart of the anticompetitive actions of Intel was their Intel-Inside marketing pro-
gram, considerations of advertising/marketing preemption where not at the forefront of the
antitrust case. In this paper we focus on non-price anticompetitive behavior arising from
marketing/advertising with a focus on the Intel case.
3.3 Data
We use several data sources for our analysis: PC and CPU sales are from Gartner Group, CPU
price data are from In-Stat and online websites, CPU quality measures are from Passmark’s
CPU benchmark publication, advertising data are from Kantar Media Group. All data are
available from the rst quarter of 2002 through the second quarter of 2009. We discuss each
in turn.
Quarterly PC and CPU sales are at the product level. A CPU product is dened as CPU
vendor (i.e., Intel), CPU family (i.e., Pentium 4), CPU speed, market(i.e., home, education,
government or business), platform group (e.g., whether is used for deskbased or mobile PC)
and detailed platform types (e.g., all–in–one for deskbased PC and Tablet PC for mobile PC)
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combination.3 A PC product is dened as PC rm (i.e., Acer), PC brand (i.e., Aspire), and
CPU product combination. We aggregate the data to the level of PC rm, PC brand, CPU
vendor, CPU family, market and platform group combination and treat the quarterly such
combination as our observation. We show the descriptive statistics in table 3.1. The total
number of observations is 23,086, among which 5668 products use AMD’s chips. The PC sales
(in quantity) per quarter is on average 9550 units and PCs equipped with AMD chips have a
slightly lower sales than the one equipped with Intel chips. To illustrate how well AMD is
adopted by PC rms and consumers, we compute the quarterly market share of PC with AMD
chips over time, where the market share is dened as the total shipment of PCs that use AMD
chips over the total shipment of all kinds of PC in a quarter. Figure 3.1 shows that only about
7% of PC sales are generated by PC with AMD chips at the beginning of 2002 and it increases
dramatically after 2005 up till more than 20%.
Figure 3.1: Market Share of PC with AMD Chip over Time
0
.
05
.
1
.
15
.
2
.
25
.
3
2002 2004 2006 2008 2010
time
AMD Market Share
CPU prices data come from In-Stat and list prices publication. In-Stat provides data on CPU
prices for selected processors of Intel, which are available by processor core on a quarterly basis.
The same processor core is often used to make CPUs that are marketed under dierent family
names with dierent sets of features enabled, and the processor core used in a CPU changes
over time as technology advances. For instance, processor core “Banias” was used for CPU
families marketed as Celeron M and Pentium M for mobile computers, while in later periods
3CPU speed is only available till the rst quarter of 2005.
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Table 3.1: Descriptive statistics
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Overall
Contains AMD CPU 23086 0.25 0.43 0.00 1.00
PC Shipment (in 1000 Unit) 23086 9.55 31.07 0.00 732.37
CPU Shipment (in 1M Unit) 23086 0.19 0.36 0.00 2.88
Price CPU (100$) 23086 1.50 0.70 0.22 6.13
CPU Revenue (in 10M$) 23086 3.03 6.57 0.00 59.59
CPU Benchmark (in 1000) 23086 0.69 0.59 0.17 6.45
PC Firm Advertising (10M$) 23086 0.92 1.95 0.00 9.38
PC Brand Advertising (10M$) 23086 0.08 0.24 0.00 2.94
CPU Vendor Advertising (10M$) 23086 0.52 0.66 0.02 4.12
CPU Family Advertising (10M$) 23086 0.07 0.21 0.00 1.71
AMD
PC Shipment (in 1000 Unit) 5668 8.56 26.53 0.00 394.71
CPU Shipment (in 1M Unit) 5668 0.09 0.13 0.00 0.64
Price CPU (100$) 5668 1.27 0.82 0.24 6.13
CPU Revenue (in 10M$) 5668 1.04 1.60 0.00 8.47
CPU Benchmark (in 1000) 5668 0.79 0.50 0.27 3.50
CPU Benchmark/Dollar 5668 8.23 6.47 1.78 31.19
PC Firm Advertising (10M$) 5668 1.08 2.09 0.00 9.38
PC Brand Advertising (10M$) 5668 0.06 0.19 0.00 1.79
CPU Vendor Advertising (10M$) 5668 0.10 0.08 0.02 0.50
CPU Family Advertising (10M$) 5668 0.04 0.17 0.00 1.71
Intel
PC Shipment (in 1000 Unit) 17418 9.87 32.40 0.00 732.37
CPU Shipment (in 1M Unit) 17418 0.22 0.40 0.00 2.88
Price CPU (100$) 17418 1.58 0.64 0.22 4.76
CPU Revenue (in 10M$) 17418 3.67 7.39 0.00 59.59
CPU Benchmark (in 1000) 17418 0.66 0.62 0.17 6.45
CPU Benchmark/Dollar 17418 5.05 5.12 1.14 35.77
PC Firm Advertising (10M$) 17418 0.87 1.89 0.00 9.38
PC Brand Advertising (10M$) 17418 0.09 0.26 0.00 2.94
CPU Vendor Advertising (10M$) 17418 0.66 0.71 0.08 4.12
CPU Family Advertising (10M$) 17418 0.08 0.22 0.00 1.70
All monetary terms were deated to 2000 dollars using Consumer Price Index (CPI)
data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
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the same CPU families switched to the next-generation processor core “Dothan”T˙o match
these data with the sales data from Gartner group, we use the product cross-reference in Table
A.1 in the appendix.4 We match the data based on platform group (whether desktop or mobile),
platform type (e.g. All–in–One, Deskbound, Desktop Replacement, etc.), family/marketing
name of a CPU, CPU speed, year, and quarter.5 We present an overview of available CPUs from
In-Stat dataset and their price variation on the CPU family level in Table A.2 in the appendix.
Intel’s list prices are collected from Intel’s price catalogs, spanning from the last quarter
of 2005 to the second quarter of 2009, while AMD’s list prices are collected from its website
using waybackmacine.com with a time period from the beginning of 2002 to the second quar-
ter of 2009. Both list price data are published at the CPU model level (e.g., Intel Celeron D
processor 340 Desktop), which contains CPU family name, model code and platform group. If
we have several observation for one CPU model in a quarter, we take the median to form the
quarterly CPU price. Intel’s list price data further contains CPU speed for most observations,
whereas AMD’s not. But their detailed information of the model name (e.g. AMD Athlon XP
Processor Mobile 1600+) allows us to assign the corresponding platform group and speed to
each observation.6 We then match these price data to the sales data from Gartner Group based
on CPU family name, CPU speed, platform group, year and quarter.7 If one observation in
Gartner data has several matches of list prices, we take the average of them. Table A.3 in the
appendix provides an overview of price variation on the CPU family level obtained from list
prices.
We show in Table 3.2 the combined CPU prices from In-Stat and list prices by CPU vendors
(i.e. Intel and AMD) and CPU families. CPU prices display signicant variation, ranging from
$22 to $613. It is also notable, that Intel’s CPUs are on average more expensive than the
AMD (as indicated in Table 3.1), with a higher variation across dierent CPU families. Within
4The cross-reference table is constructed based on In-Stat’s document and a website specialized in CPU
information, www.cpu-world.com.
5This process (and a slight generalization of it described below) generates a high match. For the CPUs not
matched at the rst attempt, we drop CPU speed, then we have 82% match. When unmatched, the data are
matched based on family/marketing name of a CPU, platform group, year, and quarter, ignoring platform types.
Then we obtain a 84% match. When the data are not matched, we try matching based on family/marketing name
of a CPU, year and quarter, ignoring platform group, and then we have 92% match. lastly, we match two datasets
based on CPU family name, platform group, platform type, ignoring time, and then we obtain 95% match. For
observations still not matched, we take the averages of prices and cost estimates of CPUs of the same marketing
name, year and quarter.
6We use the data provided by ww.cpubenchmark.net and www.cpu-world.com.
7If the rst match does not succeed, we drop speed and then perform the matching according to CPU family
name, platform group, year and quarter. If it is still not matched, we try to match based on only CPU family
name, year and quarter. For the rest unmatched observation, we ll in the prices depending on the location of
the missing. If the price is missing either at the beginning or at the end of the sequence, we replace them using
the rst or last observed prices. If it is missing in the middle, we approximate the price by linear interpolation at
the family-platform group level.
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family price variations can be explained by the distinct prices of CPUs with dierent speed
and also by the fact, that a new CPU is usually introduced into the market with a higher price
and experience a strong decline over time. Figure 3.2 illustrates how the PC sales-weighted
average CPU prices change over time for each CPU vendor. AMD’s average CPU price is
almost constantly lower than Intel’s, with exceptions at the beginning of our data period and
two spikes of AMD that are induced by the introduction of Athlon 64 and Athlon 64 X2.
Table 3.2: CPU Price in $100
CPU Firm CPU Family Median Std Dev Min Max Obs
Ath 0.92 0.35 0.55 2.07 818
Ath 64 1.43 0.73 0.29 3.21 1151
Ath 64 X2 1.19 1.35 0.49 6.13 1120
Dur 0.66 0.15 0.38 0.89 108
Phe II X3 1.07 0.00 1.07 1.07 7
AMD Phe II X4 1.55 0.00 1.55 1.55 9
Phe X3 0.98 0.14 0.93 1.33 99
Phe X4 1.31 0.25 1.29 2.01 151
Sem 0.70 0.22 0.24 1.08 1099
Tur 64 1.31 0.20 1.23 1.97 499
Tur 64 X2 1.78 0.14 1.49 2.03 607
Atom 0.33 0.02 0.22 0.34 135
Cel 1.49 0.50 0.26 1.82 2824
Cel M 1.54 0.43 0.67 1.97 1380
Cel X2 0.37 0.11 0.34 0.66 25
Core 2 Duo 2.30 0.17 1.28 2.39 2264
Core 2 Quad 2.12 0.71 1.69 4.76 370
Core 2 Solo 2.08 0.00 2.08 2.08 3
Intel Core Duo 2.37 0.44 1.05 3.08 1251
Core Solo 2.05 0.14 1.87 2.34 558
Core i7 4.48 0.02 4.46 4.51 31
P3 1.56 0.45 0.45 1.62 1002
P4 1.40 0.38 0.47 1.84 3820
PD 1.40 0.47 0.61 2.12 790
PDC 0.55 0.04 0.51 0.62 692
PM 1.85 0.24 1.53 2.57 2273
We then compute the CPU revenue of each CPU product by multiplying the shipment with
the CPU prices. As shown in Table 3.1, AMD’s revenue is only 30% of what Intel gains, which
is a result of both lower shipment and lower prices.
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Figure 3.2: PC Sales-Weighted Average CPU Prices over Time
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CPU benchmark is a continuous quality measure of the performance of each CPU model that
is collected and published by Passmark.8 This measure is generated based on users’ submission
as well as from internal testing.9 Same as list price, CPU benchmark data is reported at the
CPU model level, which allows us to connect the corresponding CPU family name, platform
group and CPU speed to each observation. We then match the benchmark data to the sales
data from Gartner group based on these three criteria.10 Table 3.3 oers a summary of the
CPU benchmark value across CPU families. AMD’s CPUs are on average better than the ones
oered by Intel (as Table 3.1 also shows), with more than half of the CPU families enjoying a
median quality measure higher than 1000. Only one third of Intel’s CPU families are able to
reach this threshold.
8www.cpubenchmark.net.
9PerformanceTest conducts eight dierent tests and then averages the results to determine the CPU Mark
for a system. To ensure that the full CPU power of a PC system is realized, PerformanceTest runs each CPU
test on all available CPUs. Specically, PerformanceTest runs one simultaneous CPU test for every logical CPU
(Hyper-threaded); physical CPU core (dual core) or physical CPU package (multiple CPU chips). So hypothetically
if you have a PC that has two CPUs, each with dual cores that use hyper-threading then PerformanceTest will
run eight simultaneous tests.
10As CPU speed information is limited in Gartner Group’s data, this approach is only possible till the rst
quarter of 2005. After that, we use the help of the list price data to infer which CPU models are marketed in
each quarter and match CPU benchmark to Gartner Group’s sales data based on CPU family name, year and
quarter. Table A.4 and Table A.5 in the appendix present the matched Benchmark on CPU family level in dierent
approaches.
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Table 3.3: CPU Benchmark
CPU Firm CPU Family Median Std Dev Min Max Obs
Ath 4.03 0.42 3.11 4.83 818
Ath 64 5.86 0.48 4.55 6.98 1151
Ath 64 X2 13.58 1.66 8.54 15.34 1120
Dur 3.11 0.34 2.72 3.50 108
Phe II X3 24.63 0.00 24.63 24.63 7
AMD Phe II X4 34.99 0.00 34.99 34.99 9
Phe X3 18.55 0.15 18.31 18.85 99
Phe X4 25.63 0.72 23.68 25.85 151
Sem 4.72 0.41 4.11 5.77 1099
Tur 64 5.09 0.26 4.33 5.09 499
Tur 64 X2 10.52 0.69 8.94 10.52 607
Atom 2.99 0.68 2.73 4.74 135
Cel 3.94 0.99 2.47 6.44 2824
Cel M 3.67 0.39 2.31 4.33 1380
Cel X2 12.20 0.00 12.20 12.20 25
Core 2 Duo 11.21 1.69 11.06 15.80 2264
Core 2 Quad 37.99 2.67 29.76 38.10 370
Core 2 Solo 3.20 0.00 3.20 3.20 3
Intel Core Duo 8.80 0.09 8.53 8.81 1251
Core Solo 3.84 1.20 3.09 6.86 558
Core i7 64.54 0.00 64.54 64.54 31
P3 2.43 0.22 1.96 2.89 1002
P4 3.57 1.09 1.65 5.37 3820
PD 8.85 0.29 8.09 9.24 790
PDC 11.30 2.08 10.32 16.58 692
PM 3.89 0.37 2.27 4.42 2273
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The benchmark scores vary not only across CPU families but also over time within a family.
This variation comes from the introduction of new CPU models with higher speed. Figure
3.3 depicts the PC sales-weighted average benchmark scores over time for both CPU vendors.
Until the beginning of 2006, AMD oers strictly better CPUs than Intel. Its lead disappears
gradually from 2006 on and at the end of our sample periods, Intel seems to gain a technological
advantage. Noting that Intel’s CPUs are consistently more expensive than those from provided
by AMD, a tie in benchmark score implies that AMD’s CPUs still have a better quality/price
ratio.
Figure 3.3: Sales-Weighted Average Benchmark over Time (CPU Vendor )
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Advertising data consist of PC and CPU advertising expenditures. It provides dierent
levels of advertising: PC rm/CPU vendor level (e.g., Lenovo or Intel), PC brand group/CPU
family group level (e.g., Lenovo ThinkPad series or Intel Core series) and PC brand/CPU family
level (e.g., Lenovo ThinkPad L412 Notebook or Intel Core i3). We refer the PC rm/CPU vendor
level advertising to general promotion, which is benecial for all PC brands or CPU families.
PC rms also advertise non-PC products such as software. We exclude these advertising
expenditures. We match this type of advertising to sales data from Gartner Group based on PC
rm/CPU vendor, year and quarter. Advertising on the level of PC brand group or CPU family
group usually contributes to more than one PC/CPU product. For instance, advertising for
Lenovo Thinkpad – Various Laptop Computers is allocated to all ThinkPad laptops documented
in Gartner Group’s data, e.g., ThinkPad G, ThinkPad R, etc. PC brand-specic or CPU family-
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specic advertisement expenditures are matched to sales data based on brand/family name,
platform, year and quarter. For those advertisements that is not platform-specic, we match
them only based on brand or brand group. There is also advertisement that faces more than
one brand/CPU (e.g. Lenovo G530 & ThinkPad Notebook Computer : Combo) or more than
one rm (e.g. Dell Inc & Intel Corp : Combo). In these cases, we match the advertisement
expenditure for both involved parties.
Table 3.1 shows that CPU vendors spent on average 5.2 million dollars on general pro-
motions and 0.7 million dollars for CPU family advertising. Compared to AMD, Intel spent
substantially more advertising, with almost 7-times more on vendor-level promotions and dou-
ble the amount on brand-level advertising than AMD. PC rms spent on average 9.2 million
dollars on general promotions and 0.8 million dollars for PC brand advertising. PCs equipped
with AMD’s CPU have a slightly higher advertisement spending than those with Intel’s CPU.
CPU vendor advertising experiences quite big variations over time, especially for Intel.
Figure 3.4 illustrates the PC sales-weighted average advertisement expenditure of AMD and
Intel over time. Intel advertises consistently more heavily than AMD through out much of the
sample periods.
Figure 3.4: Sales-Weighted Average Advertisement Spending on CPU Vendor Level
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3.4 Estimation Approach
Our goal is to identify how the advertising aects the revenue of the CPU vendors. We treat
a PC rm – PC brand – CPU vendor – CPU family – segment – platform group (e.g. Intel’s
Pentium M chip that embedded in a deskbased Acer’s Aspire N in the business segment) as
a CPU product.11 Our cross-section panel data is then dened as the CPU product over time
periods (quarters) from the rst quarter of 2002 through the second quarter of 2009.
Our dependent variable is the quarterly total revenue of a CPU family, which is the sum of
the quarterly revenue of CPUs that belong to dierent platform groups (e.g. mobile or desktop)
and market in distinct segments (e.g. home, education, etc). The explanatory variables are
the quality of the CPU (i.e. the benchmark), the advertisement done by CPU vendors, the
advertisement done by PC rms, and the time–consistent characteristics of the CPU product.
Those characteristics include the platform group that the CPU is designed for, the segment
it is sold in and for which PC rm the CPU is used. The rst one helps to control for the
unobserved quality or features that is platform–group–specic, the second one captures the
unobserved market shock. To further capture the demand environment change over time, we
also include a year xed eect.
Let TRFjmt denote the total revenue of CPU family Fj that the CPU product j belongs
to, where m is the CPU manufacturer (e.g. Intel or AMD) and t is the time. Notice that the
m subscript is redundant, as a CPU is specic to a manufacturer. Our baseline econometric
model is given by
TRFjmt = αxmjt + β1a
cpu
mjt + β2a
cpu
−mt + β3a
pc
ljt + λzlj + jmt, (3.1)
where xmjt denotes the benchmark of the CPU j, acpumjt is the CPU advertisement spending,
acpu−mt is the advertising done by rival CPU vendor−m, apcljt denotes advertising of PC rm l on
PCs with CPU j, and zmj are the set of characteristics that do not change over time, i.e. the
platform group, the segment and the PC rm it belongs to. jmt represents the idiosyncratic
error term, which we allow to be correlated within CPU products over time.
We observe various levels of aggregation of advertising expenditures. For acpumjt, we include
both the CPU vendor–specic advertising acpu−vendormt , which benets all the CPU families one
vendor has, and CPU family–specic advertising acpu−familyjt . Similarly, we use the sum of PC
rm–specic and PC brand–specic advertising to form apcljt. To compute a
cpu
−mt, we add up
the CPU vendor–specic advertising acpu−vendor−mt and the sum of all family–specic advertising
that is made by vendor −m, i.e. ∑k∈−Mk acpu−familykt , where −Mk denotes the set of CPU
11Ideally, we would also dierentiate across dierent speed groups. However, due to the missing of the cpu
speed information from 2005 onward, we aggregate the data to the above mentioned observation level.
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families that CPU vendor −m produces. That means, for all the observation j that belongs to
the same CPU vendor, they have the same rival advertising variable. This variable is used to
capture the competition eects of advertisement.
In order to test whether advertising has long run eect on the consumer’s purchase deci-
sions, and thus the revenue of CPUs, we further include the lagged advertisement of CPU up
to three quarters in our analysis. Our dynamic econometric model is as following:
TRFjmt = αxmjt + β1a
cpu
mjt + β2a
cpu
−mt + β3a
pc
ljt + γa
lag,cpu
mjt + λzlj + jt, (3.2)
where alag,cpumjt denotes the CPU advertising done in the previous periods.
To examine whether Intel use advertising not only for competition purpose but also as a
pre-emptive behavior, we test the following three scenarios: (1) we use the subsample that
only consists the observation from 2002 to 2005, as this is the period that Intel is suspected by
using marketing program to prevent PC rm from using non-Intel chips; (2) we focus on the
PC rms that buy exclusively from Intel; (3) we restrict the sample to only CPUs sold to Dell,
as the antitrust authorities document the conditional rebates from Intel to Dell.
3.5 Results
3.5.1 Static Baseline
Table 3.4 shows the pooled OLS result based on our static model. Panel (a) presents the
result for estimation for Intel CPUs and (b) for AMD CPUs. In the rst specication, we only
control for the CPU quality and the CPU characteristics that do not change over time. In the
second specication, we add own CPU advertising. In the third and fourth specications, we
further controls for rival CPU’s advertisement expenditure and advertising of the PC rms,
respectively. The last specication include all above mentioned variables.
Despite the dierent magnitude, the qualitative relation between the revenue and the focal
variables – CPU benchmark, CPU advertising, and the adverting done by PC are the same
between Intel and AMD. The better the quality of the CPU is, the more revenue a CPU family
can gain. Similarly, the higher advertisement spending from both CPU vendor or related PC
rms leads to larger revenue. We also conrm the competition eect of rival’s advertising, as
the coecient for rival CPU advertising is signicantly negative.
CPU benchmark in the last specication has similar eects for Intel and AMD, while the
revenue of Intel CPUs is aected much stronger by advertisement. That, to some extent, justify
why Intel is more prone to use marketing tool to promote its products than AMD.
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Table 3.4: Static Baseline Models
(a) Intel
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
CPU Revenue (100M$) CPU Revenue (100M$) CPU Revenue (100M$) CPU Revenue (100M$) CPU Revenue (100M$)
CPU benchmark (in 1000) 1.126∗∗∗ 0.884∗∗∗ 0.706∗∗∗ 0.675∗∗∗ 0.398∗
(0.268) (0.256) (0.248) (0.245) (0.231)
Mobile PC 0.509∗∗ 0.422∗ 0.384∗ -0.855∗∗∗ -1.134∗∗∗
(0.242) (0.233) (0.225) (0.237) (0.228)
Own CPU AD (10M$) 2.289∗∗∗ 4.240∗∗∗ 1.760∗∗∗ 4.297∗∗∗
(0.0630) (0.103) (0.0612) (0.105)
Rival CPU AD (10M$) -3.875∗∗∗ -5.227∗∗∗
(0.129) (0.148)
ADs by PC (10M$) 0.573∗∗∗ 0.675∗∗∗
(0.0277) (0.0286)
Constant 1.383 -4.182∗∗ -6.147∗∗∗ -8.778∗∗∗ -12.25∗∗∗
(1.686) (1.655) (1.624) (1.547) (1.482)
year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
PC Vendor dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Market dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 17418 17418 17418 17418 17418
Adjusted R2 0.082 0.114 0.132 0.154 0.185
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
(b) AMD
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
CPU Revenue (100M$) CPU Revenue (100M$) CPU Revenue (100M$) CPU Revenue (100M$) CPU Revenue (100M$)
CPU benchmark (in 1000) 0.324∗∗∗ 0.321∗∗∗ 0.323∗∗∗ 0.343∗∗∗ 0.347∗∗∗
(0.0415) (0.0412) (0.0410) (0.0419) (0.0417)
Mobile PC 0.109∗∗∗ 0.112∗∗∗ 0.114∗∗∗ 0.114∗∗∗ 0.116∗∗∗
(0.0319) (0.0310) (0.0311) (0.0309) (0.0309)
Own CPU AD (10M$) 0.416∗∗∗ 0.437∗∗∗ 0.280∗∗∗ 0.314∗∗∗
(0.0524) (0.0548) (0.0516) (0.0525)
Rival CPU AD (10M$) -0.0262∗∗ -0.0489∗∗∗
(0.0131) (0.0131)
ADs by PC (10M$) 0.0570∗∗∗ 0.0595∗∗∗
(0.00645) (0.00658)
Constant 1.924∗∗∗ 1.688∗∗∗ 1.743∗∗∗ 1.390∗∗∗ 1.480∗∗∗
(0.132) (0.145) (0.146) (0.151) (0.149)
year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
PC Vendor dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Market dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 5668 5668 5668 5668 5668
Adjusted R2 0.302 0.315 0.315 0.334 0.336
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
3.5.2 Dynamics Baseline
We present the estimation result after adding the lags of advertising of own CPU in table 3.6,
where the panel (a) shows the result for Intel CPUs and panel (b) for AMD. The rst column
represent the same specication as the last column in table 3.4. From specication two to
specication four, we incorporate advertisement spending lags from t − 1 period (i.e. the
previous quarter) to t− 3 period, sequentially. The last column denote the specication where
we use the cumulative advertising of the three previous quarters as the dynamic control.
All coecients for the interested variables after controlling for the dynamic eect of ad-
vertising remain with the same sign and similar value as in the static specication. We found
persistent signicant and positive eects of previous advertise spending on the current rev-
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Table 3.6: Dynamic Baseline Models
(a) Intel
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
CPU Revenue (100M$) CPU Revenue (100M$) CPU Revenue (100M$) CPU Revenue (100M$) CPU Revenue (100M$)
CPU benchmark (in 1000) 0.398∗ 0.381∗ 0.397∗ 0.463∗∗ 0.450∗∗
(0.231) (0.225) (0.223) (0.222) (0.221)
Own CPU AD (10M$) 4.297∗∗∗ 4.397∗∗∗ 4.488∗∗∗ 4.618∗∗∗ 4.603∗∗∗
(0.105) (0.118) (0.115) (0.111) (0.113)
Rival CPU AD (10M$) -5.227∗∗∗ -6.417∗∗∗ -6.838∗∗∗ -7.280∗∗∗ -7.247∗∗∗
(0.148) (0.166) (0.164) (0.165) (0.163)
ADs by PC (10M$) 0.675∗∗∗ 0.695∗∗∗ 0.684∗∗∗ 0.667∗∗∗ 0.669∗∗∗
(0.0286) (0.0280) (0.0273) (0.0260) (0.0262)
Mobile PC -1.134∗∗∗ -1.159∗∗∗ -1.111∗∗∗ -1.014∗∗∗ -1.028∗∗∗
(0.228) (0.222) (0.218) (0.215) (0.215)
Own CPU AD in t-1 (10M$) 1.377∗∗∗ 1.046∗∗∗ 1.067∗∗∗
(0.0439) (0.0344) (0.0340)
Own CPU AD in t-2 (10M$) 1.082∗∗∗ 0.669∗∗∗
(0.0622) (0.0399)
Own CPU AD in t-3 (10M$) 1.308∗∗∗
(0.0796)
Cum. CPU AD (3 quarters) 0.986∗∗∗
(0.0415)
Constant -12.25∗∗∗ -13.36∗∗∗ -13.34∗∗∗ -13.05∗∗∗ -13.11∗∗∗
(1.482) (1.440) (1.420) (1.393) (1.396)
year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
PC Vendor dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Market dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 17418 17418 17418 17418 17418
Adjusted R2 0.185 0.208 0.223 0.240 0.238
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
(b) AMD
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
CPU Revenue (100M$) CPU Revenue (100M$) CPU Revenue (100M$) CPU Revenue (100M$) CPU Revenue (100M$)
CPU benchmark (in 1000) 0.347∗∗∗ 0.347∗∗∗ 0.356∗∗∗ 0.369∗∗∗ 0.365∗∗∗
(0.0417) (0.0417) (0.0415) (0.0413) (0.0413)
Own CPU AD (10M$) 0.314∗∗∗ 0.307∗∗∗ 0.358∗∗∗ 0.324∗∗∗ 0.286∗∗∗
(0.0525) (0.0517) (0.0535) (0.0537) (0.0520)
Rival CPU AD (10M$) -0.0489∗∗∗ -0.0489∗∗∗ -0.0554∗∗∗ -0.0565∗∗∗ -0.0553∗∗∗
(0.0131) (0.0131) (0.0127) (0.0124) (0.0123)
ADs by PC (10M$) 0.0595∗∗∗ 0.0587∗∗∗ 0.0542∗∗∗ 0.0517∗∗∗ 0.0473∗∗∗
(0.00658) (0.00699) (0.00686) (0.00671) (0.00655)
Mobile PC 0.116∗∗∗ 0.116∗∗∗ 0.122∗∗∗ 0.132∗∗∗ 0.130∗∗∗
(0.0309) (0.0308) (0.0302) (0.0296) (0.0297)
Own CPU AD in t-1 (10M$) 0.0314 -0.0322 0.0739∗∗
(0.0336) (0.0265) (0.0321)
Own CPU AD in t-2 (10M$) 0.363∗∗∗ 0.251∗∗∗
(0.0383) (0.0261)
Own CPU AD in t-3 (10M$) 0.453∗∗∗
(0.0409)
Cum. CPU AD (3 quarters) 0.260∗∗∗
(0.0297)
Constant 1.480∗∗∗ 1.485∗∗∗ 1.496∗∗∗ 1.519∗∗∗ 1.541∗∗∗
(0.149) (0.148) (0.146) (0.145) (0.146)
year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
PC Vendor dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Market dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 5668 5668 5668 5668 5668
Adjusted R2 0.336 0.336 0.344 0.356 0.351
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
enue, which conrms our hypothesis that advertising has a long run eect on the consumers.
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12 And this is important to take into account, when we analyze whether Intel is using market-
ing campaign in an anticompetitive fashion. The advertising lags of Intel show a less strong
eect on the revenue than the advertising of current period, while the eects of previous and
current advertising are similar for AMD chips.
3.5.3 Subsample of 2002–2005
In this section, we discuss the estimation result obtained from data from year 2002 to the end
of year 2005. The rst three column of table 3.8 shows the regression of Intel CPU product,
with no control for dynamic eect of advertising in the rst column and using lags of the
previous three quarter separately or forming a cumulative measure in the second and the third
columns, respectively. The fourth to sixth columns present the result for CPU products of
AMD.
Table 3.8: Revenue with Own and Rival’s Advertisement, and PC rm Ad: 2002-2005
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Intel
CPU Renevue (100M$)
Intel
CPU Renevue (100M$)
Intel
CPU Renevue (100M$)
AMD
CPU Renevue (100M$)
AMD
CPU Renevue (100M$)
AMD
CPU Renevue (100M$)
CPU benchmark (in 1000) -13.04∗∗∗ -12.00∗∗∗ -12.09∗∗∗ 0.0600 0.105 0.0899
(0.581) (0.571) (0.580) (0.0675) (0.0674) (0.0689)
Own CPU AD (10M$) 3.405∗∗∗ 3.951∗∗∗ 3.862∗∗∗ 0.611∗∗∗ 0.685∗∗∗ 0.563∗∗∗
(0.0757) (0.0901) (0.0886) (0.0689) (0.0708) (0.0716)
Rival CPU AD (10M$) -3.599∗∗∗ -5.246∗∗∗ -5.049∗∗∗ -0.311∗∗∗ -0.336∗∗∗ -0.283∗∗∗
(0.135) (0.163) (0.161) (0.0301) (0.0314) (0.0317)
ADs by PC (10M$) 0.441∗∗∗ 0.470∗∗∗ 0.459∗∗∗ 0.0866∗∗∗ 0.0898∗∗∗ 0.0810∗∗∗
(0.0233) (0.0230) (0.0224) (0.00636) (0.00598) (0.00636)
Mobile PC -3.383∗∗∗ -3.215∗∗∗ -3.194∗∗∗ 0.0285 0.0393 0.0350
(0.244) (0.231) (0.231) (0.0547) (0.0520) (0.0540)
Own CPU AD in t-1 (10M$) 0.746∗∗∗ -0.189∗∗∗
(0.0325) (0.0271)
Own CPU AD in t-2 (10M$) 0.216∗∗∗ 0.0843∗∗∗
(0.0303) (0.0166)
Own CPU AD in t-3 (10M$) 0.551∗∗∗ 0.338∗∗∗
(0.0572) (0.0374)
Cum. CPU AD (3 quarters) 0.483∗∗∗ 0.0921∗∗∗
(0.0342) (0.0228)
Constant 0.732 -1.169 -0.771 1.081∗∗∗ 1.129∗∗∗ 1.205∗∗∗
(0.763) (0.761) (0.754) (0.174) (0.172) (0.173)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
PC Vendor dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Market dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 7605 7605 7605 1721 1721 1721
Adjusted R2 0.249 0.297 0.292 0.472 0.497 0.475
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Recall that we nd positive and signicant eects of CPU quality (i.e. benchmark) on
revenue for both Intel and AMD, facing the whole time period from the rst quarter of 2002 to
the second quarter of 2009. When we restrict the sample to the rst three years, the positive
eect of quality turns to negative for Intel and vanishes for AMD. That suggests PC rms
did not pick the CPU with better quality to install into their PCs. Own CPU advertisement
spending of Intel having a smaller eect on the revenue than in our dynamic baseline case
12Here, we only control for advertising up to three quarters. Table A.6 shows the specication of including
lags up to two years.
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indicates that the advertising used by Intel does not translate eciently into revenue but may
be used to defer the entry of AMD.
3.5.4 ED firms
We dene ED rms as the PC rms that exclusively use Intel CPUs for all their PCs in that
quarter. Table 3.9 shows the estimation result for Intel CPUs that are used by those ED rms.
The rst three specications include the whole sample periods, while the last three restrict
the time to 2002 – 2005.
Table 3.9: Intel Revenue among ED rms: whole sample and 2002–2005
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CPU Renevue (100M$) CPU Renevue (100M$) CPU Renevue (100M$)
2002-2005
CPU Renevue (100M$)
2002-2005
CPU Renevue (100M$)
2002-2005
CPU Renevue (100M$)
CPU benchmark (in 1000) 4.410∗∗∗ 4.304∗∗∗ 4.295∗∗∗ -12.92∗∗∗ -11.37∗∗∗ -11.53∗∗∗
(1.164) (1.126) (1.123) (1.061) (1.105) (1.110)
Own CPU AD (10M$) 3.515∗∗∗ 3.902∗∗∗ 3.887∗∗∗ 3.557∗∗∗ 4.087∗∗∗ 4.019∗∗∗
(0.243) (0.252) (0.247) (0.118) (0.129) (0.129)
Rival CPU AD (10M$) -4.004∗∗∗ -5.600∗∗∗ -5.521∗∗∗ -3.548∗∗∗ -5.116∗∗∗ -4.946∗∗∗
(0.316) (0.336) (0.323) (0.206) (0.223) (0.223)
ADs by PC (10M$) 0.458∗∗∗ 0.455∗∗∗ 0.453∗∗∗ 0.337∗∗∗ 0.361∗∗∗ 0.351∗∗∗
(0.0336) (0.0335) (0.0329) (0.0288) (0.0296) (0.0284)
Mobile PC -2.261∗∗∗ -2.003∗∗∗ -2.012∗∗∗ -3.479∗∗∗ -3.239∗∗∗ -3.232∗∗∗
(0.345) (0.334) (0.333) (0.304) (0.291) (0.292)
Own CPU AD in t-1 (10M$) 0.819∗∗∗ 0.682∗∗∗
(0.0493) (0.0447)
Own CPU AD in t-2 (10M$) 0.357∗∗∗ 0.204∗∗∗
(0.0455) (0.0437)
Own CPU AD in t-3 (10M$) 0.855∗∗∗ 0.589∗∗∗
(0.0883) (0.0834)
Cum. CPU AD (3 quarters) 0.649∗∗∗ 0.467∗∗∗
(0.0489) (0.0486)
Constant -3.372 -3.898 -3.785 -1.617 -4.004∗∗ -3.509∗∗
(2.976) (2.976) (2.980) (1.399) (1.554) (1.588)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
PC Vendor dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Market dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 6083 6083 6083 4047 4047 4047
Adjusted R2 0.251 0.299 0.297 0.250 0.298 0.294
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
When running regression on the whole time periods, CPU quality turns out to have a
positive eect on the revenue. In contrasts, CPU quality aects the revenue negatively in the
restricted time periods. That shows the existence of the ED relationship is not necessarily
induced by illegal agreement among Intel and those ED rm but the economic incentive.
It could be the case that some PC rms choose the better CPUs from Intel that are more
compatible with their PCs, and thus leads to higher demand and higher revenue for Intel.
However, the negative coecient of CPU quality in the last three columns suggests that in
that problematic period, following the ED agreement is the predominant reason for PC rms
to use Intel’s CPU exclusively.
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3.5.5 Dell
In this section, we focus on one specic ED rm with Intel – Dell. Documents from antitrust
authorities suggest that Dell indeed chose to use only CPU from Intel due to Intel’s marketing
campaign. We show the estimation result in table 3.10. The rst panel presents Intel’s revenue
through selling CPU to Dell and the second panel compares the dierence between Intel’s and
AMD’s revenue through Dell from year 2006 onward.13
In the rst three columns in panel (a), we includes the whole sample periods, while in
the last three, we only use the subsample of year 2002 to year 2005. While the Intel’s CPU
advertising and Dell’s advertising have a positive eect on CPU revenue as we discussed in
the baseline case, the quality no longer has a positive impact on revenue. The result of the last
three columns are quite similar to the ones in the last three columns in table 3.9. That conrms
that other ED rms with Intel in year 2002 – 2005 are using Intel’s CPU exclusively due to the
same reason as Dell, that they have to, rather than choosing it to maximize the prot.
In panal (b), we use the rst three columns to show the relation between the Intel’s revenue
and the interested variables and the last three for AMD. This panel exclude the possibilities
that consumers purchasing PCs from Dell does not care about CPU quality or Dell does not
care about the CPU quality that it uses. Though the revenue of Intel is not aected by the CPU
quality as shown in the rst three columns in panel (b), in the last three columns indicate that
the revenue of AMD is increasing with benchmark.
13As Dell is elusively using Intel’s CPU from 2002–2005, in order to have comparable results between AMD
and Intel, we only use the time periods that Dell uses CPU from both vendors.
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Table 3.10: Revenue from Dell
(a) Intel Revenue from Dell: whole sample and 2002–2005
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CPU Renevue (100M$) CPU Renevue (100M$) CPU Renevue (100M$)
2002-2005
CPU Renevue (100M$)
2002-2005
CPU Renevue (100M$)
2002-2005
CPU Renevue (100M$)
CPU benchmark (in 1000) -0.475 -0.382 -0.383 -11.12∗∗∗ -10.70∗∗∗ -10.75∗∗∗
(0.409) (0.402) (0.402) (1.272) (1.203) (1.204)
Own CPU AD (10M$) 4.016∗∗∗ 3.926∗∗∗ 3.937∗∗∗ 3.417∗∗∗ 3.697∗∗∗ 3.648∗∗∗
(0.213) (0.229) (0.230) (0.202) (0.199) (0.192)
Rival CPU AD (10M$) -4.672∗∗∗ -5.356∗∗∗ -5.319∗∗∗ -3.356∗∗∗ -4.351∗∗∗ -4.215∗∗∗
(0.315) (0.331) (0.321) (0.361) (0.365) (0.354)
ADs by PC (10M$) 0.623∗∗∗ 0.610∗∗∗ 0.607∗∗∗ 0.379∗∗∗ 0.400∗∗∗ 0.388∗∗∗
(0.0692) (0.0699) (0.0699) (0.0578) (0.0601) (0.0582)
Mobile PC -1.833∗∗∗ -1.577∗∗∗ -1.578∗∗∗ -3.675∗∗∗ -3.323∗∗∗ -3.323∗∗∗
(0.524) (0.513) (0.515) (0.530) (0.501) (0.505)
Own CPU AD in t-1 (10M$) 0.782∗∗∗ 0.636∗∗∗
(0.0695) (0.0740)
Own CPU AD in t-2 (10M$) 0.504∗∗∗ 0.168∗∗
(0.0998) (0.0852)
Own CPU AD in t-3 (10M$) 0.734∗∗∗ 0.609∗∗∗
(0.172) (0.131)
Cum. CPU AD (3 quarters) 0.657∗∗∗ 0.442∗∗∗
(0.0814) (0.0835)
Constant -8.749∗∗∗ -9.354∗∗∗ -9.304∗∗∗ -1.508 -2.969∗∗∗ -2.695∗∗
(0.893) (0.862) (0.852) (1.160) (1.115) (1.077)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Market dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2786 2786 2786 1300 1300 1300
Adjusted R2 0.165 0.190 0.191 0.266 0.301 0.299
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
(b) Intel and AMD Revenue from Dell: 2006 onward
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Intel
CPU Renevue (100M$)
Intel
CPU Renevue (100M$)
Intel
CPU Renevue (100M$)
AMD
CPU Renevue (100M$)
AMD
CPU Renevue (100M$)
AMD
CPU Renevue (100M$)
CPU benchmark (in 1000) -0.206 -0.233 -0.151 1.294∗∗∗ 1.299∗∗∗ 1.291∗∗∗
(0.405) (0.403) (0.404) (0.0493) (0.0429) (0.0448)
Own CPU AD (10M$) 3.355∗∗∗ 3.883∗∗∗ 3.381∗∗∗ 0.452 0.687 1.079∗∗
(0.401) (0.482) (0.399) (0.425) (0.519) (0.536)
Rival CPU AD (10M$) -8.156∗∗∗ -4.133∗∗ -6.099∗∗∗ 0.0786∗∗ 0.00254 0.0680∗
(0.998) (2.072) (1.256) (0.0387) (0.0385) (0.0379)
ADs by PC (10M$) 1.284∗∗∗ 1.190∗∗∗ 1.154∗∗∗ -0.0400∗∗∗ -0.0368∗∗ -0.0374∗∗
(0.121) (0.144) (0.144) (0.0149) (0.0143) (0.0151)
Mobile PC -1.307∗ -1.246 -1.114 0.132∗∗∗ 0.229∗∗∗ 0.221∗∗∗
(0.783) (0.759) (0.774) (0.0482) (0.0535) (0.0562)
Own CPU AD in t-1 (10M$) -0.641∗∗ 1.737∗∗∗
(0.283) (0.341)
Own CPU AD in t-2 (10M$) 2.340∗∗∗ 0.480∗∗
(0.343) (0.209)
Own CPU AD in t-3 (10M$) -0.732 -0.340
(1.108) (0.264)
Cum. CPU AD (3 quarters) 0.640∗∗ 0.602∗∗
(0.263) (0.230)
Constant -6.637∗∗∗ -7.435∗∗∗ -6.877∗∗∗ -0.921∗∗∗ -1.145∗∗∗ -1.169∗∗∗
(0.918) (1.010) (0.902) (0.147) (0.108) (0.113)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Market dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1486 1486 1486 350 350 350
Adjusted R2 0.200 0.213 0.206 0.658 0.686 0.666
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
3.6 Robustness Check
The estimation with ED rms employed above use a strict denition of exclusive dealing: zero
sales with AMD. In this specication, we classify the PC rm, whose shipment of its PC brands
with AMD chips account for less than 10% of its total shipment within a quarter, as a ED rm
with Intel. Table 3.12 shows a similar result as in the case where we use the stricter denition.
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Table 3.12: Intel Revenue with ED Firms: An Alternative Denition
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CPU Renevue (100M$) CPU Renevue (100M$) CPU Renevue (100M$)
2002-2005
CPU Renevue (100M$)
2002-2005
CPU Renevue (100M$)
2002-2005
CPU Renevue (100M$)
CPU benchmark (in 1000) 1.198∗∗∗ 1.202∗∗∗ 1.191∗∗∗ -12.89∗∗∗ -11.40∗∗∗ -11.53∗∗∗
(0.428) (0.414) (0.414) (1.019) (1.059) (1.064)
Own CPU AD (10M$) 4.221∗∗∗ 4.580∗∗∗ 4.572∗∗∗ 3.468∗∗∗ 3.909∗∗∗ 3.838∗∗∗
(0.158) (0.163) (0.161) (0.105) (0.116) (0.115)
Rival CPU AD (10M$) -5.088∗∗∗ -6.827∗∗∗ -6.793∗∗∗ -3.489∗∗∗ -4.841∗∗∗ -4.671∗∗∗
(0.227) (0.242) (0.233) (0.190) (0.208) (0.206)
ADs by PC (10M$) 0.656∗∗∗ 0.637∗∗∗ 0.638∗∗∗ 0.374∗∗∗ 0.393∗∗∗ 0.383∗∗∗
(0.0372) (0.0364) (0.0364) (0.0282) (0.0290) (0.0280)
Mobile PC -1.373∗∗∗ -1.179∗∗∗ -1.194∗∗∗ -3.582∗∗∗ -3.363∗∗∗ -3.351∗∗∗
(0.321) (0.308) (0.307) (0.298) (0.287) (0.287)
Own CPU AD in t-1 (10M$) 0.962∗∗∗ 0.664∗∗∗
(0.0465) (0.0411)
Own CPU AD in t-2 (10M$) 0.497∗∗∗ 0.161∗∗∗
(0.0495) (0.0430)
Own CPU AD in t-3 (10M$) 1.193∗∗∗ 0.557∗∗∗
(0.0970) (0.0735)
Cum. CPU AD (3 quarters) 0.856∗∗∗ 0.439∗∗∗
(0.0509) (0.0445)
Constant -12.14∗∗∗ -12.73∗∗∗ -12.78∗∗∗ -1.894 -4.114∗∗∗ -3.609∗∗
(1.500) (1.431) (1.430) (1.393) (1.523) (1.561)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
PC Vendor dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Market dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 8973 8973 8973 4532 4532 4532
Adjusted R2 0.184 0.237 0.234 0.241 0.284 0.280
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
3.7 Conclusion
In this paper, we investigate the role of advertising in the CPU industry. In particular, we test
whether Intel uses advertising as a preemptive tool to weaken its main rival – AMD. We nd
both CPU manufacturers enjoy a positive return to their revenue from advertisement spending
and advertising is not only eective in the current period but also for the future.
In terms of the preemptive eect of advertising, we nd supportive evidence both from
the data and from the estimation result. Our data shows that from 2002 to 2005, which is the
period that Intel is accused of using the marketing campaign illegally, the market share of
AMD remained relatively low. After 2005, we observe a dramatic increase in AMD’s market
share. Our estimation results show that in the problematic period (2002 – 2005) and with the
ED rms (e.g., Dell), a CPU with better quality and higher advertisement expenditure does
not necessarily lead to a higher prot. That suggests Intel does not only use advertising to be
more competitive and more protable, but rather to use it as a preemptive tool to maintain
the dominant position.
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A Addendum to Chapter 3
Table A.1: Product Cross-Reference from Processor Core to Brand Name (i.e. Marketing
Name) in Sample (Q1:2002 - Q4:2006)
Platform Type Processor Core Brand Name Speed (Frequency: MHz)
Desktop Mainstream Willamette
Pentium 4
1300 - 2000
Northwood 1600 - 3400
Prescott 2260 - 3800
Smitheld* Pentium D 2667 - 3200Presler* N/A
Conroe* Celeron N/A
Core 2 Duo N/A
Value Tualatin Pentium III 1000 - 1400
Celeron 900 - 1400
Willamette Celeron 1500 - 2000Northwood 1600 - 2800
Prescott Celeron D 2133 - 3460Cedar Mill
Cedar Mill Pentium 4 N/A
Mobile Mainstream Northwood Mobile Pentium 4-M 1200 - 2600
Prescott Mobile Pentium 4 2300 - 3460
Banias Pentium M 1200 - 1800Dothan 1300 - 2267
Yonah* Core Duo
Value Tualatin Mobile Celeron 1000 - 1330
Mobile Pentium III-M 866 - 1333
Northwood Mobile Celeron 1400 - 2500
Banias
Celeron M
1200 - 1500
Dothan 1200 - 1700
Yonah
Yonah Core Solo N/A
Low-Power Tualatin LV Mobile Pentium III-M 733 - 1000Tualatin ULV 700 - 933
Tualatin LV Mobile Celeron 650 - 1000Tualatin ULV 650 - 800
Banias LV
Pentium M
1100 - 1300
Banias ULV 900 - 1100
Dothan LV 1400 - 1600
Dothan ULV 1000 - 1300
Banias ULV
Celeron M
600 - 900
Dothan ULV 900 - 1000
Yonah ULV
Yonah ULV Core Solo N/A
Notes: ∗ Dual-core processor
Notes: ∗ Low-power mobile PCs are mini-notebook, tablet, and ultraportables. (LV: low-voltage; ULV: ultra-low-voltage)
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Table A.2: Intel CPU Instat Prices by CPU Family in $ from 2002Q1 to 2006Q4
CPU Family Median Std Dev Min Max Obs
Cel 153.25 43.71 45.12 185.73 131
Cel M 192.16 43.21 58.81 285.17 143
P3 156.00 43.34 45.12 162.40 40
P4 128.19 43.85 45.12 185.73 127
PD 202.64 54.37 61.51 212.16 12
PM 193.39 23.10 152.07 285.17 129
include both estimated and predicted prices
Table A.3: List Price
CPU Firm CPU Family Median Std Dev Min Max Obs
Ath 97 67.76 36 588 603
Ath 64 209 196.00 36 1031 542
Ath 64 X2 203 220.12 62 1031 309
Ath X2 74 18.16 56 153 61
Dur 59 20.16 39 130 56
AMD Phe II X3 135 11.55 125 145 4
Phe II X4 195 25.32 175 245 8
Phe X3 122 23.29 101 195 24
Phe X4 173 40.95 142 283 43
Sem 86 25.84 30 145 617
Tur 64 184 63.04 145 525 246
Tur 64 X2 220 60.13 154 354 93
Atom 43 33.21 20 135 234
Cel 70 24.08 30 134 589
Cel M 107 32.13 45 161 208
Cel X2 53 16.35 43 86 107
Core 2 Duo 284 93.50 113 637 1015
Core 2 Quad 266 138.41 163 851 381
Core 2 Solo 262 9.46 241 262 104
Intel Core Duo 183 123.39 113 706 625
Core Solo 241 25.38 209 278 51
Core i3 123 10.54 113 133 10
Core i5 196 34.18 176 284 44
Core i7 546 277.42 278 1054 150
P4 218 185.69 55 999 179
PD 199 285.17 74 999 89
PDC 74 8.69 64 87 202
PM 304 113.52 130 702 409
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Table A.4: CPU Benchmark Scores by CPU Family (Gartner Based)
AMD: 2002Q1-2004Q4, Intel: 2002Q1-2005Q3
CPU Firm CPU Family Median Std Dev Min Max Obs
Ath 376 94.48 183 765 55
AMD Ath 64 574 84.10 425 682 16
Dur 272 99.50 243 428 3
Sem 421 154.09 318 922 20
Cel 405 387.26 170 1688 64
Cel M 380 152.47 151 908 22
Intel P3 265 52.62 195 356 11
P4 275 147.46 148 688 42
PD 905 229.60 672 1301 8
PM 348 107.62 211 596 27
Table A.5: CPU Benchmark Scores by CPU Family (List price Based)
CPU Firm CPU Family Median Std Dev Min Max Obs
Ath 413 83.82 330 684 56
Ath 64 579 69.53 425 758 232
Ath 64 X2 1304 198.84 805 1781 177
Ath X2 1296 151.26 1036 1603 58
Phe II X3 2463 133.32 2250 2594 8
AMD Phe II X4 3435 322.44 3076 4323 23
Phe X3 1885 155.50 1593 2095 29
Phe X4 2541 311.51 1941 3047 38
Sem 460 48.65 362 604 227
Tur 64 467 62.71 387 616 115
Tur 64 X2 970 138.40 768 1273 56
Atom 313 146.18 163 668 56
Cel 409 302.79 170 1688 363
Cel M 402 109.33 221 908 123
Cel X2 1267 80.21 1173 1415 9
Core 2 Duo 1345 440.94 563 2414 689
Core 2 Quad 3787 495.11 2976 4606 103
Core 2 Solo 320 78.76 311 502 23
Intel Core Duo 880 148.49 537 1144 132
Core Solo 325 248.20 250 921 37
Core i3 2763 74.25 2710 2815 2
Core i5 3111 842.16 1236 4227 14
Core i7 5692 2055.63 1416 10454 64
P4 357 152.26 148 688 134
PD 885 189.61 672 1301 40
PDC 1264 422.10 711 2504 125
PM 374 101.54 211 596 102
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Table A.6: Revenue Controlling with More Advertisement Lags
(a) Intel
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CPU Revenue (100M$) CPU Revenue (100M$) CPU Revenue (100M$) CPU Revenue (100M$) CPU Revenue (100M$) CPU Revenue (100M$)
CPU benchmark (in 1000) 0.546∗∗ 0.582∗∗∗ 0.608∗∗∗ 0.659∗∗∗ 0.690∗∗∗ 0.783∗∗∗
(0.223) (0.223) (0.225) (0.224) (0.224) (0.228)
Own CPU AD (10M$) 4.405∗∗∗ 4.434∗∗∗ 4.312∗∗∗ 4.317∗∗∗ 4.475∗∗∗ 4.036∗∗∗
(0.112) (0.113) (0.124) (0.124) (0.126) (0.109)
Rival CPU AD (10M$) -6.995∗∗∗ -6.921∗∗∗ -6.789∗∗∗ -6.912∗∗∗ -7.139∗∗∗ -5.912∗∗∗
(0.160) (0.160) (0.168) (0.167) (0.168) (0.142)
ADs by PC (10M$) 0.682∗∗∗ 0.677∗∗∗ 0.680∗∗∗ 0.711∗∗∗ 0.701∗∗∗ 0.697∗∗∗
(0.0258) (0.0256) (0.0256) (0.0256) (0.0256) (0.0254)
Mobile PC -0.993∗∗∗ -0.952∗∗∗ -0.937∗∗∗ -0.928∗∗∗ -0.859∗∗∗ -0.808∗∗∗
(0.214) (0.214) (0.214) (0.213) (0.212) (0.216)
Own CPU AD in t-1 (10M$) 1.121∗∗∗ 1.124∗∗∗ 1.149∗∗∗ 1.087∗∗∗ 1.102∗∗∗
(0.0369) (0.0353) (0.0370) (0.0353) (0.0357)
Own CPU AD in t-2 (10M$) 0.648∗∗∗ 0.650∗∗∗ 0.650∗∗∗ 0.763∗∗∗ 0.701∗∗∗
(0.0397) (0.0399) (0.0394) (0.0422) (0.0408)
Own CPU AD in t-3 (10M$) 0.996∗∗∗ 0.940∗∗∗ 0.926∗∗∗ 0.891∗∗∗ 0.964∗∗∗
(0.0562) (0.0541) (0.0526) (0.0500) (0.0521)
Own CPU AD in t-4 (10M$) 0.948∗∗∗ 0.718∗∗∗ 0.697∗∗∗ 0.657∗∗∗ 0.602∗∗∗
(0.0764) (0.0636) (0.0616) (0.0611) (0.0579)
Own CPU AD in t-5 (10M$) 0.505∗∗∗ 0.391∗∗∗ 0.338∗∗∗ 0.372∗∗∗
(0.0509) (0.0359) (0.0361) (0.0374)
Own CPU AD in t-6 (10M$) 0.287∗∗∗ -0.157∗∗∗ -0.218∗∗∗
(0.0647) (0.0449) (0.0434)
Own CPU AD in t-7 (10M$) 1.110∗∗∗ 0.778∗∗∗
(0.0566) (0.0405)
Own CPU AD in t-8 (10M$) 0.806∗∗∗
(0.0542)
Cum. Own CPU AD (2 years) 0.596∗∗∗
(0.0325)
Constant -12.70∗∗∗ -12.72∗∗∗ -12.56∗∗∗ -12.75∗∗∗ -12.84∗∗∗ -11.85∗∗∗
(1.372) (1.365) (1.365) (1.342) (1.337) (1.347)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
PC Vendor dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Market dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 17418 17418 17418 17418 17418 17418
Adjusted R2 0.248 0.250 0.251 0.260 0.264 0.252
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
(b) AMD
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CPU Revenue (100M$) CPU Revenue (100M$) CPU Revenue (100M$) CPU Revenue (100M$) CPU Revenue (100M$) CPU Revenue (100M$)
CPU benchmark (in 1000) 0.383∗∗∗ 0.393∗∗∗ 0.408∗∗∗ 0.417∗∗∗ 0.421∗∗∗ 0.420∗∗∗
(0.0412) (0.0413) (0.0416) (0.0417) (0.0418) (0.0417)
Own CPU AD (10M$) 0.328∗∗∗ 0.343∗∗∗ 0.350∗∗∗ 0.336∗∗∗ 0.336∗∗∗ 0.291∗∗∗
(0.0539) (0.0538) (0.0531) (0.0536) (0.0536) (0.0517)
Rival CPU AD (10M$) -0.0652∗∗∗ -0.0584∗∗∗ -0.0623∗∗∗ -0.0596∗∗∗ -0.0598∗∗∗ -0.0591∗∗∗
(0.0126) (0.0125) (0.0126) (0.0125) (0.0125) (0.0123)
ADs by PC (10M$) 0.0531∗∗∗ 0.0522∗∗∗ 0.0522∗∗∗ 0.0532∗∗∗ 0.0527∗∗∗ 0.0492∗∗∗
(0.00670) (0.00672) (0.00673) (0.00676) (0.00675) (0.00626)
Mobile PC 0.139∗∗∗ 0.142∗∗∗ 0.148∗∗∗ 0.151∗∗∗ 0.153∗∗∗ 0.153∗∗∗
(0.0292) (0.0290) (0.0289) (0.0289) (0.0289) (0.0289)
Own CPU AD in t-1 (10M$) 0.0822∗∗ 0.0769∗∗ 0.0853∗∗ 0.0810∗∗ 0.0708∗∗
(0.0362) (0.0347) (0.0351) (0.0345) (0.0336)
Own CPU AD in t-2 (10M$) 0.323∗∗∗ 0.272∗∗∗ 0.272∗∗∗ 0.266∗∗∗ 0.262∗∗∗
(0.0320) (0.0290) (0.0288) (0.0287) (0.0286)
Own CPU AD in t-3 (10M$) 0.334∗∗∗ 0.362∗∗∗ 0.317∗∗∗ 0.313∗∗∗ 0.310∗∗∗
(0.0286) (0.0299) (0.0279) (0.0269) (0.0268)
Own CPU AD in t-4 (10M$) 0.385∗∗∗ 0.222∗∗∗ 0.257∗∗∗ 0.217∗∗∗ 0.212∗∗∗
(0.0438) (0.0322) (0.0342) (0.0325) (0.0324)
Own CPU AD in t-5 (10M$) 0.381∗∗∗ 0.234∗∗∗ 0.280∗∗∗ 0.269∗∗∗
(0.0427) (0.0238) (0.0238) (0.0227)
Own CPU AD in t-6 (10M$) 0.385∗∗∗ 0.274∗∗∗ 0.295∗∗∗
(0.0424) (0.0362) (0.0351)
Own CPU AD in t-7 (10M$) 0.281∗∗∗ 0.219∗∗∗
(0.0321) (0.0260)
Own CPU AD in t-8 (10M$) 0.150∗∗∗
(0.0314)
Cum. Own CPU AD (2 years) 0.234∗∗∗
(0.0202)
Constant 1.540∗∗∗ 1.532∗∗∗ 1.548∗∗∗ 1.550∗∗∗ 1.558∗∗∗ 1.583∗∗∗
(0.144) (0.143) (0.143) (0.143) (0.143) (0.144)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
PC Vendor dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Market dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 5668 5668 5668 5668 5668 5668
Adjusted R2 0.365 0.372 0.380 0.383 0.384 0.382
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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